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BALANCING FREEDOM OF SPEECH*
David S. Bogen**
The symbol for justice - a blindfolded goddess holding scales -
is particularly appropriate in free speech cases, for when courts
engage in balancing interests, they often do not know what they
are weighing or even, sometimes, which way the scale tilts.
The Supreme Court uses several criteria to determine whether a
law violates the guarantee of freedom of speech contained in the first
amendment. The test most frequently used, and most vociferously
criticized, is the balancing of interests,' which requires the Court to
weigh the importance of the interest advanced by the challenged
governmental action against the degree to which it restricts
expression. When the ideas were expressed through actions that
have consequences additional to those stemming from the exposition
of the ideas, even Justice Black, the most noted spokesman for the
"absoluteness" of the first amendment, found himself "balancing." 2
When conduct that is not constitutionally protected is entangled
with speech, regulation of the unprotected conduct may simultane-
ously suppress speech. In such cases it is the duty of courts, before
upholding such regulations, "to weigh the circumstances and to
appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the
regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights" of speech and press.3
Critics of the balancing test have argued that it violates the
language of the first amendment, which "absolutely" prohibits laws
abridging free speech,4 and that the test provides no guidance for
determining whether the balance of interests favors sustaining a
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1. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
2. See id. at 141-45 (Black, J., dissenting).
3. NLRB v. Fruit & Veg. Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 78 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring) (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
4. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, passim (1970).
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law.5 The first criticism is easily met. The words "freedom of speech
and of the press" are not self-defining. They may well mean that the
speaker has the right to express ideas without fear that the
government will punish the speaker because it disagrees with his
views. In this light, the command of the first amendment is an
absolute prohibition on governmental suppression of ideas.6 But
relatively few laws restricting speech are justified on the grounds
that the ideas expressed are noxious; instead, other reasons are
offered. The balancing of interests, then, is a means to determine
whether the challenged action served a legitimate end, that is,
whether the speech was restricted because the ideas were objection-
able or whether its restriction was only incidental to the advance-
ment of a legitimate interest of government.
The second criticism of the balancing test - that it licenses
judges to uphold or strike down laws on the basis of their personal
values rather than those expressed in the Constitution - has some
validity. This argument, however, is overstated because it ignores
the function and limitations of the balancing test. When the stated
governmental interest is a harm resulting from the idea expressed,
the Court does not balance interests: if the harm is that persons
hearing the speech will act upon it, the Court employs a variety of
the clear and present danger test;7 and if the harm is that the speech
directly injures the listener, the Court uses tests of categorization,
determining whether the speech may be classified as fighting words,
obscenity, or libel.8 It is only when the harm at which the law is
purportedly directed is not caused by the content of the speech that
the Court relies on a balancing analysis to discover whether
antipathy for the content of the speech underlies the law.
The Court's use of the balancing technique to resolve these
limited first amendment issues is intertwined with ancillary first
amendment doctrines. These doctrines, which are designed to assure
that the rule affecting speech is no broader than necessary to
accomplish the desired legitimate purpose and that the appropriate
rule-making body focused on the speech problem, include prior
restraint, narrow construction, preemption, overbreadth, vagueness,
5. Cf. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 56 (1960) (Meiklejohn goes so far as
to argue that "the logic of the plan of self-government, as defined by the Constitution,
decisively rejects the 'balancing' theory . . .")
6. See Bogen, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Guarantee of Freedom
of Speech, 35 MD. L. REV. 555 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Freedom of Speech].
7. See id. at 563-73.
8. See id. at 575-615.
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and equal protection. 9 If a governmental act is not invalidated under
one of these doctrines, the Court is almost always willing to balance
in favor of the government - the Court has already determined that
the appropriate governmental body has considered the need for the
action in light of its effect on speech and has acted only to the extent
necessary to further its nonspeech interests. The balancing test may
be viewed as a rare resort in case the protectable interest is slight or
the magnitude of law's effect on expression suggests that the true
purpose of the governmental action was to kill the idea. It is more
commonly found in opinions upholding governmental acts or
implied in the application of ancillary doctrines invalidating the
challenged action. 10
This Article sets forth the major categories of governmental
interests invoked in cases to which balancing applies. It examines
the manner in which the Court has approached these cases in order
to demonstrate how the Court's decisions can be reconciled with the
general theory of the first amendment stated above.
I. SPEECH PLUS
"It's not what she says, but the way that she says it."
Until an idea is expressed, neither the government nor any
individual other than the person having the idea knows of its
existence. The expression of the idea, however, is not itself the idea,
and the mode of expression may pose a threat to governmental
interests quite apart from that posed by the idea. To use an extreme
example, assassination of a public official may express opposition to
government policies, but it is also an act of murder. The attempt to
protect citizens from the consequences of the mode of expression
9. See Bogen, First Amendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 MD. L. REV. 769 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Ancillary Doctrines].
10. For example, Justice Harlan's concurrence in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968), see text accompanying notes 70 to 79 infra, posited a law that was
clear and precise, deliberately restricting all forms of speech to further a legitimate
public interest. He then raised the possibility that the hypothetical law's effect on
speech would be so great that the Court would declare it unconstitutional. See text
accompanying note 78 infra.
In the preparation of opinions, members of the Court may consider balancing
and ancillary doctrines simultaneously. The order of consideration in the opinion
itself, however, is a product of the writer's desire to persuade. If the law is to be
invalidated, the Court is likely to begin with an emphasis on its impact on speech and
then show how ancillary doctrines forbid it. If the law is to be upheld, the Court will
begin by analyzing the importance of the interest secured by the law and proceed to
demonstrate how the law before it is tailored to secure the interest. The use of the
balancing test apart from ancillary doctrines to strike down governmental acts is very
unusual, however, and it is in that sense that the text refers to it as a "rare resort."
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chosen is likely to be legitimate, but some scrutiny is necessary to be
sure that such regulation is not simply a pretext for suppressing the
idea. Litigation over regulation of the means of expression has
involved five major areas: picketing and demonstrations, symbolic
speech, expenditures of money to influence the political process,
speech that is an integral part of a commercial transaction, and
censorship of broadcast media.
A. Picketing and Demonstrations - The Public Forum
The use of the streets and sidewalks of a community as a public
forum is a cheap way to reach the public with ideas, and sometimes
enables the speaker to reach the portion of the public with whom he
is particularly concerned more effectively. In Thornhill v. Ala-
bama,1" the Supreme Court struck down a statute that prohibited
picketing a business on the ground that the statute was overbroad.12
The Court pointed out that picketing at the site of the business may
be the only practicable means by which interested parties "may
enlighten the public on the nature and causes of a labor dispute. The
safeguarding of those means is essential to the securing of an
informed and educated public opinion with respect to a matter which
is of public concern." 13 The Court then stated that the statute failed
to identify any legitimate state interests to be protected:
The power and the duty of the State to take adequate steps to
preserve the peace and to protect the privacy, the lives, and the
property of its residents cannot be doubted. . . .Section 3448 in
question here does not aim specifically at serious encroachments
on these interests and does not evidence any such care in
balancing these interests against the interest of the community
and that of the individual in freedom of discussion on matters of
public concern. 14
This recognition of the connection between picketing and the
dissemination of ideas was quickly followed by a recognition that
picketing was more than simple communication. As Justice Douglas,
11. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
12. See id. at 99.
13. Id. at 104.
14. Id. at 105. Restrictions on the use of amplification have generated another line
of cases involving regulation of means of expression. The Court has affirmed the
legitimacy of limits clearly designed to protect the peace and privacy of the home, but
struck down laws whose vague standards might permit administrative authorities to
use a content-based licensing approach. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
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concurring in the reversal of another labor picketing conviction,
stated:
[p]icketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since
it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very
presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or
another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are
being disseminated. Hence those aspects of picketing make it the
subject of the restrictive regulation. 15
The focus of the Court in subsequent cases shifted to the aspects
of picketing that are "more than speech" as it began to uphold state
laws restricting picketing. In Giboney v. Empire Storage Co.,1 6 the
Court sustained an injunction against picketing for the purpose of
forcing a merchant to refrain from selling to nonunion peddlers. The
Court found that such a joint exercise of economic power was more
than speech: "[the union members] were doing more than exercising
a right of free speech; 1 7 they "were exercising their economic power
together with that of their allies to compel Empire to abide by union
rather than by state regulation of trade."' 8
The crowning decision in the line of cases holding that picketing
may be restricted was International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local
695 v. Vogt, Inc.,19 in which the Court sustained an injunction
against picketing that had caused several truck drivers to refuse to
make pickups or deliveries at the plaintiffs plant. Justice Frankfur-
ter's opinion for the Court reviewed the history of its labor picketing
decisions - "[t]hese cases involved not so much questions of free
speech as review of the balance struck by a State between picketing
that involved more than 'publicity' and competing interests of state
policy"20 - and concluded that labor picketing was a form of
economic pressure that could be forbidden when utilized to frustrate
a valid state policy. 21
It has not been entirely clear whether the vulnerability of
picketing to regulation stems from its nature as a signal to others
who have tacitly agreed to use their economic position to aid
15. Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
16. 336 US. 490 (1949).
17. Id. at 503.
18. Id.
19. 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
20. Id. at 290.
21. See id. at 293-95.
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picketers22 or from the implied threat of force or other intimidation
which physical presence presents. 23 When the general public is
addressed and the physical presence of the pickets presents no
threat, the Court has permitted the picketing. When the picketing is
aimed at persuading the general public not to purchase the products
of the struck company as opposed to forcing other employers to cease
doing business with that company, the Court has permitted the
picketing. 24
When related problems were raised by demonstrations, particu-
larly those of civil rights groups during the 1960's, the Court tended
to apply the balancing tests derived from the labor cases, although
the conduct on which it focused was inconvenience to others using
the streets, rather than implied threats or an exertion of economic
power. Before attempting to balance the interest ostensibly protected
by the statute against the interests of speech, however, the Court
first demanded that the law be narrowly drafted to focus on the
particular legitimate interest. For example, in Edwards v. South
Carolina,25 the Court reviewed the convictions of persons who
demonstrated on the statehouse grounds. The Court characterized
the demonstrations as "an exercise of . . . basic constitutional
rights in their most pristine and classic form, '2 6 but nevertheless
suggested that such a demonstration could be punished if it violated
laws specifically directed to the physical presence of the demonstra-
tors: "[i]f, for example, the petitioners had been convicted upon
evidence that they had violated a law regulating traffic, or had
disobeyed a law reasonably limiting the periods during which the
State House grounds were open to the public, this would be a
different case."27 The convictions were reversed because the breach
of peace statute violated was too vague and could have been directed
against the ideas being expressed. 28
22. See id. See also T. EMERSON, supra note 4; Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the
Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574, 591-602 (1951).
23. See NLRB v. Fruit & Veg. Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 82-83 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB, 401
F.2d 952, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
24. See NLRB v. Fruit & Veg. Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) (construing
statute to permit such picketing); Ancillary Doctrines, supra note 9, at 696-701.
25. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
26. Id. at 235.
27. Id. at 236 (footnote omitted).
28. See id. at 237. More specifically, the Court explained that
[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a State to make criminal the
peaceful expression of unpopular views .... [T]he courts of South Carolina
have defined a criminal offense so as to permit conviction of the petitioners if
their speech stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a
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Similarly, the Court struck down a breach of the peace
conviction in Cox v. Louisiana,29 because the statute was "unconsti-
tutionally vague in its overly broad scope." 30 The Louisiana Supreme
Court had defined the statutory term "breach of peace" as "to
agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to
hinder, to disquiet." 31 Referring to the statute struck down in
Edwards, the Cox Court concluded that "[b]oth definitions would
allow persons to be punished merely for peacefully expressing
unpopular views," and ruled that the statute was "unconstitutional
in that it swe[pt] within its broad scope activities that are
constitutionally protected free speech and assembly. '32
Two other statutes in Cox were directed more specifically to
conduct. The first forbade obstructing public passages, and the
Court indicated that a uniformly enforced policy designed to regulate
traffic would be constitutional even though it might prevent certain
demonstrations at certain times:
The control of travel on the streets is a clear example of
governmental responsibility to insure this necessary order. A
restriction in that relation, designed to promote the public
convenience in the interest of all, and not susceptible to abuses
of discriminatory application, cannot be disregarded by the
attempted exercise of some civil right which, in other circum-
stances, would be entitled to protection.33
Nevertheless, because the Louisiana authorities had not applied the
obstruction statute uniformly and had allowed various parades to
take place, the Court struck down a conviction. The statute
contained no standards to guide the administrators in its applica-
tion, and this discretion gave rise to the possibility, which may have
been suspected in the case, that the statute would be enforced only
against those who opposed local authorities. 34
condition of unrest. A conviction resting on any of those grounds may not
stand.
Id. at 237-38. See also Ancillary Doctrines, supra note 9, at 714-26 for a discussion of
vagueness in the context of ancillary doctrines.
29. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
30. Id. at 551. See also Ancillary Doctrines, supra note 9, at 705-14 for a
discussion of overbreadth.
31. 379 U.S. at 551 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 14:103.1 (West 1962) (repealed
1976)).
32. Id. at 551-52.
33. Id. at 554.
34. See id. at 557-58. See generally Ancillary Doctrines, supra note 9, at 682-85.
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The defendants in Cox were also convicted of violating a statute
which forbade picketing near a courthouse with the intent to
influence persons there in the performance of their duties. The Court
upheld this statute on its face. It identified the interest to be
protected as the fair administration of justice and noted that
picketing was conduct that implied physical pressure, and that, as
conduct, it could be regulated. 35 Because the regulation was narrowly
limited to picketing "near" the courthouse, it did not attempt to
suppress the idea of judicial criticism. Thus, the Court held that the
statute on its face was "a valid law dealing with conduct subject to
regulation so as to vindicate important interests of society and that
the fact that free speech is intermingled with such conduct does not
bring with it constitutional protection." 36 The Court reversed the
convictions, however, because according to the on-the-spot interpre-
tation of the police official the location of the picketing was not
"near" the courthouse. 37
Two more cases illustrate the manner in which the Court has
carefully focused on the interests that the statutes prohibiting
demonstrations were designed to serve, striking them down
whenever the interest included the suppression of distasteful speech
but upholding them when a clearly speech-neutral interest was
perceived. In Brown v. Louisiana,3 the Court reversed a conviction
under the Louisiana breach of the peace statute of defendants who
had stood quietly in a public library to demonstrate discontent with
the library's segregation policies. The Court noted that the breach of
the peace language was the same as that involved in Cox 39 but a
different portion of the statute was involved because the conduct
took place in a public building. The Court found that the
demonstrators did not violate the statute because no disruption of
the library had occurred, but concluded that even if the statute did
apply to the defendants' conduct, it could not constitutionally be
applied to punish the petitioners' actions40 because they had a
constitutional right "in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by
silent and reproachful presence, in a place where the protestant has
every right to be, the unconstitutional segregation of public
facilities."'41 Two notions are combined in this approval of the
35. 379 U.S. at 563 (1965).
36. Id. at 564.
37. Id. at 572-73.
38. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
39. Both cases applied LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103.1 (West 1962) (repealed 1976).
For the statute's definition of breach of the peace, see text accompanying note 31.
40. 383 U.S. at 142.
41. Id.
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demonstrators' conduct. First, the location of the protest was open to
the general public. Second, the demonstrators' conduct did not
interfere with the primary use of the building:
Fortunately, the circumstances here were such that no claim can
be made that use of the library by others was disturbed by the
demonstration. Perhaps the time and method were carefully
chosen with this in mind. Were it otherwise, a factor not present
in this case would have to be considered. Here, there was no
disturbance of others, no disruption of library activities, and no
violation of any library regulations. 42
The Court has, however, recognized a right to exclude all
persons from certain areas even though they wish to express ideas
there. In Adderley v. Florida,43 the Court upheld convictions for
trespass of demonstrators on jailhouse grounds protesting the arrest
of their fellows. In Brown the Court intimated that the arrests for
breach of peace were in fact based on dislike for the message of the
protestors, but in Adderley there was no evidence to suggest that the
trespass arrest was made "because the sheriff objected to what was
being sung or said by the demonstrators or because he disagreed
with the objectives of their protest. ' 44 When the interest that the
state seeks to protect is the use of its facilities for a designated
purpose without interference, and the nature of those facilities is not
inherently open to the public as are streets and parks, the state can
bar unauthorized persons. "The State, no less than a private owner
of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for
the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. ' 45
In the past several years, the Court has been forced to decide
whether particular municipal property is ordinarily open to the
public and the consequences of allowing particular members of the
public to use that property as a forum. In Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights,46 the Court held that a city could bar political advertise-
ments from its buses on the theory that public transportation, rather
than constituting a normal public forum, was a commercial venture
provided by the city, and that card space was incidental to the
provision of transportation and merely part of the commercial
42. Id.
43. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
44. Id. at 47.
45. Id.
46. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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venture.47 Given this limited view of the public-forum aspects of
public transportation, the Court looked to the equal protection clause
to define the applicable rule of law, reasoning that the denial of
access to advertising on public transit to all political speech did not
appear designed to suppress such speech, but rather to "minimize
chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of
imposing upon a captive audience." 48 The plurality opinion was
written by Justice Blackmun and joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White and Rehnquist. Justice Douglas concurred on the
basis that all messages on buses are addressed to a captive audience
who are there for necessary transportation, and no speaker has a
right to force his message on a captive audience. 49 Justice Brennan
argued in dissent that although the city need not have transit
advertising, the decision to lease the space for commercial and
public service advertisements made it a public forum and that such
space could not, therefore, be denied on the basis of content.50
An interesting contrast between content and place regulation
was presented in the case of Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad.51 The district court had refused to enjoin the implementa-
tion of a theatre director's order denying an application for the use of
47. Here, we have no open spaces, no meeting hall, park, street corner, or other
public thoroughfare. Instead, the city is engaged in commerce .... The card
space, although incidental to the provision of public transportation, is a part
of the commercial venture. In much the same way that a newspaper or
periodical, or even a radio or television station, need not accept every proffer
of advertising from the general public, a city transit system has discretion to
develop and make reasonable choices concerning the type of advertising that
may be displayed in its vehicles.
Id. at 303.
48. Id. at 304. See discussion of equal protection in Ancillary Doctrines, supra
note 9, at 726-36.
49. "In my view the right of commuters to be free from forced intrusions on their
privacy precludes the city from transforming its vehicles of public transportation into
forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience." 418 U.S. at 307
(Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas had dissented many years earlier in Public
Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952), from a decision upholding the bus
company's practice of broadcasting radio programs in buses and streetcars.
50. See 418 U.S. at 314-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan employed a
balancing test to determine whether the card space was a public forum: "'The
determination of whether a particular type of public property or facility constitutes a
'public forum' requires the Court to strike a balance between the competing interests
of the government, on the one hand, and the speaker and his audience, on the other."
Id. at 312 (footnote omitted). Because the transit system had opened the space for
advertising, Justice Brennan found no significant government interest in restricting
speech. Having found the card space to be a public forum under his balancing test, he
argued that the content-oriented restriction of speech could not be sustained. Id. at
315.
51. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
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a municipal facility for the showing of the play "Hair" on the
ground that conduct in the production was obscene and thus was not
entitled to first amendment protection. 52 The Supreme Court found
that because a municipal theatre is a public forum "designed for and
dedicated to expressive activites, ' 5 3 such rejection constituted an
unlawful prior restraint in violation of the first amendment. As this
was a public forum, the majority found that prior restraint would be
justified only when the defendants' actions fell within one of the
narrowly defined exceptions to first amendment protection, such as
obscenity, and then only when certain procedural safeguards were
followed. 54 The dissenters argued, inter alia, that the city could
create a forum for limited speech purposes, and that given this
limited nature, the content of the play need not be considered
obscene in order to be excluded from the theatre.55 Chief Justice
Burger and Justice White argued that even if "Hair" were not
obscene for adults, "Chattanooga may reserve its auditorium for
productions suitable for exhibition to all the citizens of the city,
adults and children alike." 56 Justice Rehnquist stated that "if it is
the desire of the citizens of Chattanooga, who presumably have paid
for and own the facility, that the attractions to be shown there
should not be of the kind which would offend any substantial
number of potential theatergoers, I do not think the policy can be
described as arbitrary or unreasonable. '5 7
In its public forum aspect, Conrad may be thought of as a
Lehman twist. There was no captive audience in Conrad, and the
Lehman dissenters were joined by Justices Douglas and Blackmun
in finding the theatre to be a public forum in which the attempted
municipal control of content was improper. But Justice Rehnquist's
suggestion that the majority decision destroys managerial control is
not necessarily accurate. If the management decision were based on
the likely profit to be made by the play in a lease that provided for a
percentage of the income as rent, or if the theatre were dedicated to
plays and its use denied to lectures, such decisions might be upheld
52. Southeastern Promotions, Inc. v. Conrad, 341 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
53. 420 U.S. at 555.
54. First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that the
material is unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any restraint prior to
judicial review can be imposed only for a specified brief period and only for
the purpose of preserving the status quo. Third, a prompt final judicial
determination must be assured.
Id. at 560 (emphasis in original). See also Ancillary Doctrines, supra note 9, at 688.
55. See, e.g., 420 U.S. at 571-72 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 569 (White, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 572 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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by the Court. They would, or might, be based on factors extraneous
to the ideas expressed.
In Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.58
Justice Marshall, in the course of setting forth the rules governing
picketing on state-owned property, summarized the state's interest in
such regulation as follows:
Thus, where property is not ordinarily open to the public, this
Court has held that access to it for the purpose of exercising
First Amendment rights may be denied altogether .... Even
where municipal or state property is open to the public generally,
the exercise of First Amendment rights may be regulated so as
to prevent interference with the use to which the property is
ordinarily put by the State ...
In addition, the exercise of First Amendment rights may be
regulated where such exercise will unduly interfere with the
normal use of the public property by other members of the public
with an equal right of access to it. 5 9
In general, these rules have governed as to public property; if it is
open to the public, regulation must be based on interference with its
normal use or with the rights of others having equal rights to access.
Justice Marshall was overly sanguine, however, in attempting to
apply the same rules to private property when the owners invited
members of the general public, explaining the Court's decision to
strike down an injunction against labor picketing in a suburban
shopping center as follows:
All we decide here is that because the shopping center serves as
the community business block "and is freely accessible and open
to the people in the area and those passing through," . . . the
State may not delegate the power, through the use of its trespass
laws, wholly to exclude those members of the public wishing to
exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises in a
manner and for a purpose generally consonant with the use to
which the property is actually put.60
58. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
59. Id. at 320-21.
60. Id. at 319-20. Logan Valley has its roots in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946), a case in which a company town had attempted to ban all handbilling. The
majority there overturned the trespass convictions on the theory that when a
privately owned area takes on all the attributes of a town, its rules may be deemed
public for first amendment purposes.
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The Court's ringing defense of shopping center speech in Logan
Valley has subsequently been shelved - the Court first distin-
guished Logan Valley to a shadow of itself and then blew the
shadow away. On the basis of the Logan Valley decision, anti-war
demonstrators in Portland, Oregon obtained an injunction in district
court to prevent the owners of a shopping complex from interfering
with their handbilling. In Lloyd Corp. Ltd. v. Tanner,61 the Supreme
Court reversed, emphasizing the rights of private property owners.
Logan Valley was distinguished on the grounds that, first, the
message there was directly related to the property, 62 and, second, the
location of the store with whom the labor dispute existed in Logan
Valley was such "that no other reasonable opportunities for the
pickets to convey their message to their intended audience were
available." 63
In Hudgens v. NLRB,64 the plurality opinion of Justice Stewart
conceded that "the reasoning of the Court's opinion in Lloyd cannot
be squared with the reasoning of the Court's opinion in Logan
Valley, '65 and the concurring opinion of Justice Powell agreed that
Logan Valley should be overruled. 66 The Hudgens Court concluded
that a large self-contained shopping center is not the equivalent of a
municipality, and that the restrictions of the first amendment on
governmental action therefore did not apply to the owner of the
shopping center. In short, "the pickets . . . did not have a First
Amendment right to enter this shopping center for the purpose of
advertising their strike .... "67
The Court's opinion in Lloyd was by no means as absolute as
the Hudgens decision suggests. Indeed, the thrust of the Lloyd
opinion was to create a balancing test - the rights of the private
property owner to unilateral control of his property balanced against
interests of free speech: "It would be an unwarranted infringement
61. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
62. The significance of the first distinction is questionable in view of the fact that
on the day that it decided Lloyd the Court held in Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407
U.S. 539 (1972), that the first amendment did not protect a labor organization's use of
handbilling in the customer parking lot of a downtown store in order to organize that
store.
63. Id. at 563. In Lloyd, on the other hand, the anti-war message clearly had no
relation to any purpose for which the shopping center was being used, and thus was
plainly directed at the general public as opposed to the operators of the enterprise.
Moreover, the Court viewed the public streets surrounding the enclosed shopping mall
as providing an alternative site for communication. Id. at 564.
64. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
65. Id. at 518.
66. See id. at 523 (Powell, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 521.
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of property rights to require them to yield to the exercise of First
Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative
avenues of communication exist. Such an accomodation would
diminish property rights without significantly enhancing the
asserted right of free speech." 6 In this balance, it appears inevitable
that the property owner will win unless the effect of law supporting
him will totally suppress discussion of some matter.
The Hudgens case was remanded to the National Labor
Relations Board, which, under section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, was required to weigh employees' rights to organize
and take concerted action for mutual aid and protection against the
property rights of the shopping center owner. On remand, the Board
upheld the right of the union to picket on the ground that there were
no other reasonable means of communication for employees seeking
to publicize the facts of their dispute.6 9 Thus, despite the language of
its opinion, the Hudgens Court did not really consider what result
would have been required under the first amendment if all other
means of communication had been unavailable.
Governmental respect for individual property and the owner's
right to control use of it does not normally evidence an attempt to
stifle speech. When there is only one location at which certain ideas
might have a significant audience, however, allowing the owner to
prevent such speech suggests a possible intention to stifle all speech
other than that emanating from the government. Virtually every
community has some locations open to the public. When all such
places are privately owned, so that there is no possibility of public
discussion without the consent of owners of pi*ivate property, the
Court may yet find that they are the equivalent of a municipality for
the purposes of that community. Such an approach would enable the
Court to distinguish Hudgens and assure that trespass laws are not
used as a mechanism to suppress speech. At present, a majority of
the Court believes that trespass laws serve legitimate social interests
if other means of communication remain open and perhaps even if
they do not, but a minority of its members has expressed concern
that the diminution in public discussion may be more significant
than the injury to a property owner who has opened his property to
the general public.
68. 407 U.S. at 567.
69. Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414 (1977).
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B. Symbolic Speech - The Banner Still Waving
Picketing and marching are not the only forms of expression
that present "speech plus" difficulties. Forms of symbolic speech
may also raise the issue whether prohibitory legislation is directed at
the expressive act or against the idea expressed. In United States v.
O'Brien,70 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
statute prohibiting the knowing destruction or mutilation of a draft
card.71 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had held that
because the conduct punishable under the statute at issue was also
punishable under the existing nonpossession statute,72 the destruc-
tion or mutilation statute served no permissible interest and ran
afoul of the first amendment by singling out persons engaged in
public protest.7 3 In reversing this determination, the Supreme Court
held that the government's interest in preventing the destruction of
draft cards was separate from, and unrelated to, any desire to curtail
the expression of opposition to the nation's military policy, 74 and
articulated the following general test for resolving "speech plus"
questions:
we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Govern-
ment; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction
on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.7 5
This is as clear a statement as can be found on the methodology
of the Court in "speech plus" cases. The first clause requires a court
to find that the challenged regulation comes within the affirmative
powers granted to the government, for example, that it. is a
regulation of commerce, or that it is "necessary and proper" for
raising an army. Next, the regulation must further an "important or
substantial" government interest. The O'Brien opinion does not
70. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
71. 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(b)(3) (1976).
72. 32 C.F.R. 1617.1 (revoked 1972).
73. O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538, 541 (1st Cir. 1967).
74. The Court found that the statute promoted verification of the registration and
classification of suspected delinquents, communication between registrants and local
draft boards, observance of other statutory requirements and the prevention of
fraudulent use of the draft cards. 391 U.S. at 378-80.
75. Id. at 377.
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speak of balancing because it is assumed that if the interest is
important the incidental impact on speech will not prevent the
regulation, but balancing occurs nonetheless, for the government
interest must be important or substantial before it justifies
restricting free speech. This criterion suggests that the Court was
attempting to ensure that the interest asserted was real and not just
a pretext for censoring thought. The third clause identifies the core
of the Court's reading of the first amendment: that the governmental
interest pursued cannot be the suppression of ideas. 76 Finally, the
requirement that the restriction be no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of the interest is a variation of the ancillary first
amendment doctrines of vagueness, overbreadth, and improper
delegation; if the law prohibits more speech than is necessary to
vindicate the governmental interest, it may also be directed at ideas
rather than simple vindication of the interest.
The general principles stated in O'Brien continue to command
great support on the Court. 77 There is, however, a caveat expressed
in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion that a regulation may be
invalid if it results in total suppression of an idea:
[T]his passage [the test from O'Brien quoted above] does not
foreclose consideration of First Amendment claims in those rare
instances when an "incidental" restriction upon expression,
imposed by a regulation which furthers an "important or
substantial" governmental interest and satisfies the Court's
other criteria, in practice has the effect of entirely preventing a
"speaker" from reaching a significant audience with whom he
could not otherwise lawfully communicate. 71
76. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study of the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975).
The reference of O'Brien's second [third as used in text above] criterion is...
not to the ultimate interest to which the state is able to point, for that will
always be unrelated to expression, but rather to the causal connection the
state asserts. If, for example, the state asserts an interest in discouraging
riots, the Court will ask why that interest is implicated in the case at bar. If
the answer is (as in such cases it will likely have to be) that the danger was
created by what the defendant was saying, the state's interest is not unrelated
to the suppression of free expression within the meaning of O'Brien's criterion
Id. at 1497.
77. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-94
(1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
413 (1974).
78. 391 U.S. at 388-89 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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This caveat is consistent with the majority's analysis in that it also
suggests a focus on whether the government may in fact have been
using legislation neutral on its face to suppress thought.
O'Brien has been criticized by commentators who argue that the
legislation in question was adopted for the purpose of suppressing
dissent to the war in Vietnam.7 9 The legislative history suggests that
the penalty was higher for destruction of such cards than for wilful
nonpossession in order to deter protestors who expressed their
disapproval of governmental policies by burning their draft cards.
Yet, if the rationale was to adjust the penalty to the level necessary
to deter the specific harm to the selective service system (the mass
destruction of draft cards), it was directed to a legitimate state
interest. Thus, the Court supported the law.
Another form of symbolic speech that has received increasing
attention is flag desecration. The communicative connotation of the
flag has long been recognized by the Court, and this may be the
reason that a majority of the Court has never upheld a conviction for
flag desecration.80 In Street v. New York,"' the Court overturned a
conviction because it may have been based on the defendant's
casting of contemptuous words upon the flag rather than his act of
burning it.82 A Massachusetts flag desecration statute, which made
it a criminal offense to treat "contemptuously" the flag of the United
States, was struck down for vagueness in Smith v. Goguen.8 3 Goguen
had worn a small flag sewn to the seat of his trousers. The Court
found the line between casual and contemptuous treatment of the
flag too uncertain to give the defendant notice that his conduct was
proscribed.
When presented with an analogous statute that prohibited
"improper use" of, and specifically forbade attaching any mark
upon, the flag, the Court held in Spence v. Washington 4 that the
79. See T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 84-85.
80. Cf. note 101 and accompanying text infra (flag desecration may be a form of
"symbolic speech").
81. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
82. Id. at 594. But see Radich v. New York, 401 U.S. 531 (1971) (per curiam), in
which an equally divided Court upheld the conviction of an artist who had used the
flag in his work, wrapped in the shape of a penis.
83. 415 U.S. 566 (1974). See also discussion of vagueness aspects of Goguen in
Ancillary Doctrines, supra note 9, at 721-22.
84. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam). It should be pointed out that, in addition to
the removability of the tape and the private ownership and display of the flag, the
Court relied on the fact that the defendant's message was direct and likely to be
understood, that he was charged under an improper use statute rather than a




statute could not constitutionally be applied to a person who
attached a peace symbol to the flag with removable tape. After
pointing out that the defendant's flag was privately owned and had
been displayed on private property, the Spence majority ruled that
the defendant's action was a form of protected expression.85 They
then catalogued the reasons that the state might offer for its
"improper use" statute other than suppressing speech. There was
nothing in the record to suggest that the display had threatened to
cause a breach of the peace, and, as the Court noted, offense to the
sensibilities of passers-by cannot be sufficient to stop speech. 86
Moreover, there was no suggestion that Spence's use had created
any risk that people would erroneously assume he was a government
official or endorsed by the government. The only interest that the
Court suggested might justify the legislation was the need to
preserve the physical integrity of the flag so that it could be used in
the future as a patriotic symbol. Because the tape that Spence used
was removable, the Court held that such an interest did not apply to
him, and that he could not properly be convicted. The majority thus
left open the question of the validity of narrowly drawn flag
desecration statutes.8 7
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
White, argued that the true interest of the state is in "preserving the
flag as 'an important symbol of nationhood and unity,' "8 and that
this is a legitimate state interest: "the flag is a national property,
and the Nation may regulate those who would make, imitate, sell,
possess, or use it." 9 They found no attempt to suppress speech
because the statute still permitted verbal criticism of the flag; only
defacing the flag was prohibited.90 Finally, the dissenters found
85. Id. at 408-09. The Court characterized the defendant's conduct as "a pointed
expression of anguish by appellant about the then current domestic and foreign
affairs of his government." Id. at 410.
86. Id. at 412.
87. Id. at 415. The majority in Goguen carefully avoided direct commitment on
the fundamental free speech issues involved in flag desecration statutes, passing only
on the vagueness and overbreadth of the statute. Spence involved an improper use
statute, so there is still no direct ruling on a narrowly drawn flag desecration statute
such as the federal one.
88. 418 U.S. at 421 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 422 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,
587 (1974)).
90. 418 U.S. at 422-23. Accord, Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 599 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("Since the statute by this reading punished a variety of uses of the flag
which would impair its physical integrity, without regard to presence or character of
expressive conduct in connection with those uses, I think the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.").
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untenable the majority's distinction of flag desecration statutes from
the improper use statute which the majority held could not be
applied to Spence:
The suggestion that the State's interest somehow diminishes
when the flag is decorated with removable tape trivializes
something which is not trivial. The State of Washington is
hardly seeking to protect the flag's resale value, and yet the
Court's emphasis on the lack of actual damage to the flag
suggests that this is a significant aspect of the State's interest.
Surely the Court does not mean to imply that appellant could be
prosecuted if he subsequently tore the flag in the process of
trying to take the tape off.91
The state's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of
national ideals is frustrated by any criticism of the state, so of course
such an interest is not a valid one. 92 The interest in preserving a
particular flag owned by a private person so that others may use it,
if the present owner so allows, for their own patriotic purposes is
incredibly trivial in view of the ease with which another flag can be
made and the speculative nature of future use of that particular one.
Thus, it is likely that Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and
Stewart, who participated in the per curiam opinion in Spence, and
Douglas, who concurred in it,93 would overturn all flag desecration
statutes despite the studious avoidance of the issue in Goguen.94
The property interest of the nation in the flag postulated by the
dissenters in the flag desecration cases is unique. Justice White
91. 418 U.S. at 420 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
92. The assumption of the Court in Street was that verbal expressions of
contempt for the flag were clearly protected by the first amendment. Yet, if the flag
represents a set of ideas, verbal criticism of the country or its ideals can distort the
message of the flag as greatly as physical abuse. Professor Ely has suggested that the
state could argue that defacing a flag interferes with the message of the state like a
heckler interfering with a speaker. Ely, supra note 76, at 1504. The defiling of a flag
should not have any such impact.
93. 418 U.S. at 415 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas' opinion indicated
no support for the theory of the flag as "national property."
94. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 583 n.32 (1974). Justice Blackmun's
concurrence in the result in Spence must be viewed in light of his dissent in Goguen.
In Goguen, he stated that punishment of the defendant was permissible "for harming
the physical integrity of the flag by wearing it affixed to the seat of his pants." 415
U.S. at 591. His concurrence in the per curiam opinion in Spence is thus surprising. It
may be illuminated somewhat by the emphasis of the dissenters in Spence that the
state interest is not merely the "physical integrity of the flag," (citing Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Goguen), but also preserving the flag as a symbol. This
suggests that Justice Blackmun saw the interest only in terms of preserving the
physical character of the flag.
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argued in Goguen that because the United States has made the flag
its national symbol by law, the United States is the owner of the
design and thus may restrict its use however it wishes. Ownership of
a design, however, is very different from ownership of a specific
material object. Its closest analogy is to proprietary interests
protected by copyright law.9 5 This analogy would support laws to
prevent the use of the flag in a fraudulent fashion to suggest that a
product is produced or supported by the government. It does not,
however, support flag desecration statutes. Copyright laws encour-
age expression by granting limited monopolies for commercial
exploitation; 96 the government does not need any such monopoly
protection to encourage the expression of its views or ideals. Further,
copyright laws do not prohibit a critic from disparaging a
copyrighted title or language within the work, nor do they prevent a
purchaser from burning a copy of the work to show his displeasure
with it. 7 The only governmental interest apparent in preserving the
physical integrity of the flag is the promotion of respect for it, and
this interest should not suffice.98 The government may properly issue
guidelines for the display or use of the flag by those who wish to
show respect, but condemnation for failure to show respect is
difficult to square with any other case in this area. The attempt to
justify such condemnation by pointing to the nonexpressive features
of the conduct reflects more love than logic,99 more realism than
95. Justice Rehnquist even made this analogy in Goguen, 415 U.S. at 602-03
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
96. See generally 1 M. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS §§ 1.01-.11 (1978).
97. "Mr. Wolfe is in the middle of a fit. It's complicated. There's a fireplace in the
front room, but it's never lit because he hates open fires. He says they stultify mental
processes. But it's lit now because he's using it. He's seated in front of it, on a chair
too small for him, tearing sheets out of a book and burning them. The book is the new
edition, the third edition, of Webster's New International Dictionary, Unabridged,
published by the G. & C. Merriam Company of Springfield, Massachusetts. He
considers it subversive because it threatens the integrity of the English language." R.
STOuT, GAMBIT 2 (Bantam ed. 1964) (Nero Wolfe burning third edition of Webster's
New International Dictionary page by page).
98. "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
... or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). In that
case, the Court held that school authorities could not require Jehovah's Witnesses to
salute the flag.
99. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Goguen collects many eloquent examples of the
use of the flag to symbolize the glorious hopes and ideals of our nation. Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 601-02 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Yet its status as the symbol
par excellence for what this country means to itself and to mankind makes its
defilement a particularly expressive gesture. If defacing the flag is a punishable
taboo, it is so only because we cannot bear to have our history and ideas rejected. Yet
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reason, 1°° and, unfortunately, more speciousness than concern for
speech. Nevertheless, at least in rhetoric, even the justices who
would uphold flag desecration statutes cling to the principle that the
government may not punish for the purpose of suppressing the idea
of opposition to the government. Symbolic acts have been recognized
as speech 0 1 and the divisions on the Court are over the legitimacy of
the nonspeech interest that the government asserts in condemning
the act.
C. Expenditures for Political Purposes - "Money Talks"
Despite the insistent repetition of the phrase "free speech," it
remains true that most speech costs money. If ideas are to be
translated into changes in society, they need a larger audience than
will be available to the sidewalk speaker. If a government wishes to
suppress an idea in our society, it need not forbid expression; it will
be almost as effective if it merely forbids the expenditure of money to
promote the idea. On the other hand, money may be used for far
more than the purchase of a temporary means of communication. It
can buy votes, and the prevention of bribery and corruption in the
political process is a proper end of legislation. Moreover, there are no
first amendment problems with most governmental attempts to
reduce disparities of wealth or the severity of inequalities of power
stemming from disproportionate wealth. Thus we have a progressive
tax system, programs of social welfare, recognition of fundamental
rights which must be afforded persons unable to pay, etc. But when
Congress attempted to redress the imbalance in ability to communi-
cate that stems from inequalities in wealth, the Court ruled that the
first amendment forbade it.
In Buckley v. Valeo,102 the Supreme Court struck down federal
laws limiting the amount of money an individual could spend in
in making the flag a sacred object, we ourselves defile it; for its central meaning is
that all people must be free to criticize every aspect of government.
100. The reference to state flag desecration statutes in the Court's opinion in
Goguen, id. at 581-82, indicates the depth of feeling involved in this issue. Allowing
-flag desecration might hurl the Court into bitter attacks reminiscent of those which
greeted its decisions on school prayer. E.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
Attacks on objects of reverence are always hated and feared. Nonetheless, Justice
Jackson's words in Barnette hold true here: "The case is made difficult not because
the principles of its decision are obscure but because the flag involved is our own." 319
U.S. at 641.
101. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam); Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker,the
wearing of black armbands was recognized as speech "closely akin to 'pure speech.
." Id. at 505.
102. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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promoting his own candidacy or political views, basing its holding
upon the premise that political expression is one of the most
fundamental first amendment activities, and the dependence of such
communication on expenditure of money had never itself been
deemed to introduce a nonspeech element into such expression. 10 3
The Court reasoned that if the government's interest is the
prevention of an idea from being accepted because it has greater
circulation than competing ideas, the interest is inextricably tied to
the forbidden end of suppressing ideas.10 4 The Court did not need to
resort to any form of a balancing test in order to reach this
conclusion.105
Other aspects of the federal legislation gave the Court more
problems. Money may be spent in aid of a candidate in order to make
him act favorably towards the spender. This is a subtle form of
bribery. When money is given to the candidate directly and the
candidate then chooses to spend it in the campaign, the initial gift is
subject to regulation, which raises no significant problem of free
speech, to prevent the possibility of corruption. If the money is given
directly to the campaign at the candidate's behest, the essence of the
problem remains; it still may be an exchange agreement of money
for candidate favor. The Court therefore upheld that portion of the
federal legislation that limited contributions to the candidate's
campaign committee.10 6
Rather than contributing to the campaign, independent groups
or persons may make direct expenditures to support a candidate or
his position. Such expenditures may also be attempts to influence
the candidate to do favors for the spender, but the absence of any
coordination between the candidate and the person expending
money in support of his candidacy substantially weakens the ability
of that person to obtain favors from the candidate. As the Court
stated, "[t]he absence of pre-arrangement and coordination of an
expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the
103. See id. at 39.
104. See id. at 48-49, 54.
105. The Court explained that
[tihe interests served by the Act include restricting the voices of people and
interest groups who have money to spend and reducing the overall scope of
federal election campaigns .... Unlike O'Brien, where the Selective Service
System's administrative interest in the preservation of draft cards was wholly
unrelated to their use as a means of communication, it is beyond dispute that
the interest in regulating the alleged "conduct" of giving or spending money
"arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the
conduct is itself thought to be harmful."
Id. at 17.
106. Id. at 29.
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value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the
danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for
improper commitments from the candidate. ' 10 7 Thus, the Court
found that portion of the legislation that limited direct expenditure
to support a candidate or his position unconstitutional because it
burdened expression without serving any substantial governmental
interest.
Recently, the Court once more considered legislation against
expending money for political purposes. In First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti,08 it struck down a Massachusetts statute that
prohibited corporations from making expenditures for the purpose of
influencing the vote on referendum proposals not materially
affecting the property, business, or assets of the corporation. The
statute further specified that no question concerning the taxation of
income, property, or transactions of individuals shall be deemed to
have such a material effect on any corporation.
Justice Powell's opinion for the majority is interesting on two
counts. First, he explicitly stated that the issue was not whether the
party suing had first amendment rights - a concern that focuses on
the speaker - but rather that "the question must be whether § 8
abridges expression that the first amendment was meant to
protect."'10 9 Although the O'Brien criteria 10 led naturally to a focus
on the expression rather than the identity of the speaker, Bellotti
provided the first occasion for the Court to make this explicit. This
shift in focus from speaker to speech in turn led to the conclusion
that speech on political issues before the electorate is subject to the
protections of the first amendement.
Having concluded that the applicable speech was clearly entitled
to first amendment protection, Justice Powell then inquired into, and
quickly rejected, the notion that the speech might be deprived of its
protection by virtue of the corporate identity of the speaker."' Only
Justice Rehnquist's dissent argued the validity of the Massachusetts
law based on the proposition that corporations have no first
amendment rights." 2
The other dissenters agreed that corporations are protected by
the first amendment but argued that the prohibition at issue was
justified by the potential for using advantages conferred by the state
107. Id. at 47.
108. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
109. Id. at 776.
110. See notes 70 to 78 and accompanying text supra.
111. 435 U.S. at 784.
112. Id. at 822-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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for business purposes to acquire an unfair advantage in the political
process. This justification, which bears a close relationship to the
concern rejected in Buckley,113 was rejected by the Bellotti Court
on the theory that "[t]he fact that advocacy may persuade the
electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it . ".. .,,4 Justice Powell
found no need to pursue further discussion on any argued distortion
of the political system because he found "no showing that the
relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even
significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts or that there
has been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in govern-
ment."1
1 5
It is Justice Powell's treatment of the second justification
proffered that is striking. Massachusetts had argued, and the
dissenters agreed, that the legislation was needed to ensure that
corporate shareholders would not be compelled to support ideas with
which they disagreed. The majority responded that the limit to
referenda, and particularly referenda on taxation of individuals, was
underinclusive because corporate speech on many other issues could
be equally offensive to shareholders. Justice Powell's opinion further
argued that the statute did not permit expenditures even if the
shareholders unanimously approved them and disapproving share-
holders had the opportunity to bring a derivative suit for corporate
waste to protect their interests, and concluded that the overbreadth
and underinclusiveness of the statute "undermine[d] the plausibility
of the State's purported concern for the persons who happen to be
shareholders in the banks and corporations covered by § 8."116
In sum, the Bellotti Court saw that the real purpose of the
Massachusetts statute was to secure passage of taxation proposals
by limiting the speech of its opponents. When the interests proffered
by the state were slight or were tied to suppressing the expression of
ideas, the balance in Buckley and Bellotti was struck in favor of
expression.
D. Commercial Speech - The Marketplace of Ideas?
Commercial speech has had an interesting history in the Court.
It is treated here, in the discussion of "speech plus," because it is by
definition inextricably linked to an act - the exchange of money for
goods or services. Speech colors such transactions, but it is the
113. See notes 102 to 105 and accompanying text supra.
114. 435 U.S. at 790.
115. Id. at 789-90 (footnote omitted).
116. Id. at 793.
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transaction itself that concerns the government. The purpose of most
regulations of commercial speech is to prevent purchasers from
being deceived- or harmed, not to prevent them from having ideas
about certain goods. The Court has been careful to distinguish
between speech that is merely paid for by the speaker or by the
listener, and speech by a person engaged in commerce and directed
at influencing a commercial transaction. Only the latter is covered
by the term "commercial speech."'1 17
The commercial speech cases began with Valentine v. Chres-
tensen,118 which upheld a time, place, and manner ordinance that
prohibited distribution of commercial handbills or advertising
matter upon any public street or in any public place. The defendant
had attempted to attract customers to an exhibition of a submarine
by distributing handbills that advertised the submarine on one side
and protested the refusal of the city to allow him to use certain wharf
facilities on the other. The Court viewed this protest as a ruse
calculated to insulate the advertisement from regulation. If the
handbill had contained only the protest against the denial of
facilities, it might have been protected, but the ordinance was not
directed at such protest. It applied only to commercial advertising on
handbills, and the Court sustained this limited application, explain-
ing:
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper
places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating
information and disseminating opinion and that, though the
states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the
privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or
proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are
equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising. Whether,
and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful
occupation in the streets, to what extent such activity shall be
adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are matters for
legislative judgment."19
Thus the Court regarded advertising merely as a component of a
commercial transaction and determined that, as such, it could be
regulated in the public interest.120
117. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rels., 413 U.S. 376,
385 (1973). See text accompanying note 129 infra.
118. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
119. Id. at 54.
120. The state can regulate such transactions by forbidding tampering with the
goods, by forbidding false or misleading statements to induce their purchase, or by
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Another case decided on similar grounds was Breard v.
Alexandria.121 There a municipal ordinance of Alexandria, Louisi-
ana which forbade uninvited door-to-door solicitation of orders for
the sale of goods had been applied to the sale of magazine
subscriptions. A similar ordinance had previously been held
unconstitutional as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses promoting their
religious beliefs, 122 but the Court distinguished the Alexandria
ordinance on the basis that its object was commercial activity.
Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that magazine subscrip-
tions were a form of expression entitled to the protections of the first
amendment. The Court, however, focused on the act of sale, pointing
out that the ordinance applied to all such commercial activities and
was not directed at stopping the spread of information, despite its
incidental effect on magazine sales. The salesman was not
promoting particular views; he was trying to make a profit.
In Valentine and Breard the Court was faced with regulations of
the time, place, and manner of engaging in commercial speech.
Although the Court has been more receptive to regulations of the
time, place, and manner of engaging in speech than to content
regulation, it had previously struck down regulations similar to
those in Valentine and Breard when they were applied to political
speech. 123 The laws invalidated could have amounted to an effective
foreclosure of forums for political speech, raising at least the
possibility that the regulations were adopted for the purpose of
suppressing ideas. But the Valentine and Breard Courts may have
perceived that such a purpose was quite unlikely when the speech
affected was commercial in nature. Forbidden to solicit door-to-door
or to handbill in the streets, businesses will turn to advertising in the
media or through the mail and add the costs of such advertising to
the price of the goods. In other words, increasing the costs of
communication for noncommercial speech may totally silence it, but
increasing the cost of commercial speech is likely simply to increase
forbidding intrusive advertising. See generally Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer
Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661 (1977).
121. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
122. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). Even in Martin the Court was
closely divided. The dissenters saw the local ordinance as directed at the act of
intruding on an individual's privacy at his residence, but the majority argued that
because the individual could protect his or her privacy by a "no solicitors" sign, the
ordinance swept too broadly in preventing persons from spreading their ideas in
places where the resident might actually be willing to listen to them.
123. An anti-littering law prohibiting the distribution of handbills on public streets
was invalidated in Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), when applied to
noncommercial speech, and a door-to-door solicitation ban was struck down when
applied to the Jehovah's Witnesses in Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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the cost of the product or service. 1 24 This suggests that time, place,
and manner limitations on commercial speech are responsive to
legitimate state concerns of aesthetics and personal privacy rather
than illegitimate attempts to suppress the ideas and information
communicated.
The Court in Valentine and Breard reacted to its perception that
time, place, and manner restrictions which were impermissible for
noncommercial speech had a different quality as applied to
commercial speech, by announcing that commercial speech was not
protected by the first amendment. In other words, the Court applied
a categorization test when faced with such speech. 125 Time, place,
and manner restrictions did not totally stifle commercial speech, and
the Court did not feel obliged to examine the intent underlying such
regulation. When faced with subsequent laws directed at the content
of, rather than the manner of engaging in, commercial speech, the
Court was forced to scrutinize the justifications proffered for such
laws and to change its doctrines. 26
The treatment of commercial speech began to change in
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rela-
tions.12 7 There, a city ordinance proscribed discrimination in
employment on the basis of sex and made it unlawful for "any
person . . . to aid . . . in the doing of any act declared to be an
unlawful emoloyment practice by this ordinance."' 128 Pursuant to
124. But cf. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977) (rejecting the
argument that attorney advertising would result in higher attorneys' fees and
concluding that the effect of allowing attorney advertising would likely be the
opposite). For a discussion of the impact of commercial speech on the overbreadth
doctrine, see Ancillary Doctrines, supra note 9, at 712-13.
125. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
126. The labels affixed to the categories of unprotected speech - fighting words,
obscenity, libel - appear to refer to the content of the speech. The definitions used by
the Court, however, require distinctions to be made on the basis of the context of the
speech - whether the words were uttered face-to-face, whether the speaker was
negligent in gathering facts, or whether the purpose of the speaker was to arouse lust.
This definitional process has enabled the Court to ensure that the legislature focused
on an interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Commercial speech,
however, is always uttered in the context of an exchange transaction. Thus, a
statute's focus on the context of the speech does not assure the Court of a legitimate
interest motivating the legislation.
127. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). It is interesting to note that although the dissent in
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 308 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
had expressed doubt as to the special position of commercial speech, it went on to say
that it was "sufficient for the purpose of public forum analysis merely to recognize
that commercial speech enjoys at least some degree of protection under the First
Amendment, without reaching the more difficult question concerning the amount of
protection afforded." Id. at 314-15 n.6 (emphasis in original).
128. 413 U.S. at 378.
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this law, the Pittsburgh Press was ordered to cease and desist from
making any reference to sex in employment advertising column
headings, except for jobs exempt from the ordinance. The newspaper
argued that the law infringed freedom of the press, but, in a five-to-
four decision, the Court upheld the order.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, began by pointing out
that "no suggestion is made in this case that the Ordinance was
passed with any purpose of muzzling or curbing the press. Nor does
Pittsburgh Press argue that the Ordinance threatens its financial
viability or impairs in any significant way its ability to publish and
distribute its newspaper."'1 29 He concluded that the want-ad
headings were commercial speech under Valentine rather than
protected speech under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan:130
The critical feature of the advertisement in Valentine v.
Chrestensen was that, in the Court's view, it did no more than
propose a commercial transaction, the sale of admission to a
submarine .... In the crucial respects, the advertisements in
the present record resemble the Chrestensen rather than the
Sullivan advertisement. None expresses a position on whether,
as a matter of social policy, certain positions ought to be filled
by members of one or the other sex, nor does any of them
criticize the Ordinance or the Commission's enforcement
practices. Each is no more than a proposal of possible
employment. The advertisements are thus classic examples of
commercial speech.13'
The newspaper argued that even if the want ads were commercial
speech, the column headings were separate statements by the paper.
Justice Powell replied that "[tihe combination [of want ad and sex-
129. Id. at 383 (footnote omitted). When laws have singled out the communications
media for restriction, the Court has struck them down. See, e.g., Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), invalidating a tax on gross receipts derived from
advertising by publications having a weekly circulation in excess of 20,000. "[I]n the
light of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated
device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public
is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties." Id. at 250. When the laws have
been part of a broader scheme of control not discriminating against the media,
regulations which affected the media have been upheld. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951) (statute prohibiting door-to-door sales applied to peddlers of magazine
subscriptions). See also Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951)
(application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to newspapers); Associated Press v. NLRB,
301 U.S. 103 (1937) (application of the National Labor Relations Act to a news
service).
130. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
131. 413 U.S. at 385.
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differentiated column headings], which conveys essentially the same
message as an overtly discriminatory want ad, is in practical effect
an integrated commercial statement."'132 His majority opinion also
132. Id. at 388. Chief Justice Burger in dissent saw the newspaper's action as
disassociated from the employer's discrimination. He stated that "[aissuming,
arguendo, that the First Amendment permits the States to place restrictions on the
content of commercial advertisements, I would not enlarge that power to reach the
layout and organizational decisions of a newspaper." Id. at 393. Surely individuals
are permitted to hold the opinion that certain jobs are more suitable for, or appealing
to, one sex than another and to express that opinion. Moreover, the paper ran the
following notice underneath its column headings:
Jobs are arranged under Male and Female classifications for the convenience
of our readers. This is done because most jobs generally appeal more to
persons of one sex than the other. Various laws and ordinances - local, state
and federal, prohibit discrimination in employment because of sex unless sex
is a bona fide occupational requirement. Unless the advertisement itself
specifies one sex or the other, job seekers should assume that the advertiser
will consider applicants of either sex in compliance with the laws against
discrimination.
Id. at 394. Chief Justice Burger concluded: "Especially in light of the newspaper's
'Notice to Job Seekers,' it is unrealistic for the Court to say, as it does, that the sex-
designated column headings are not 'sufficiently disassociate[d]' from the 'want ads
placed beneath [them] to make the placement severable for First Amendment
purposes from the want ads themselves.'" Id. (footnote omitted).
Justice Stewart, dissenting, also assumed that "the city may prohibit
employers from indicating any such discrimination [as to sex] when they make
known the availability of employment opportunities." Id. at 400. But the order in
question was directed at the newspaper, not the employer. The newspaper did not
itself discriminate in employment of its employees and its decision to place the want
ads in sex-segregated columns was arguably an exercise of journalistic discretion. As
Justice Stewart saw it, the question was "whether any government agency - local,
state, or federal - can tell a newspaper in advance what it can print and what it
cannot." Id. "Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments," he concluded, "no
government agency in this nation has any such power." Id. (footnote omitted).
The essence of the division on the Court was whether the newspaper was
acting independently in making its sex-segregated columns or was enmeshing itself in
an act of sex discrimination by the advertiser. The dissenters pointed out that the
existence of column headings and the decision as to what ads were placed in which
column were made by the newspaper, so that, in effect, the column headings were
tantamount to an expression of opinion by the newspaper as to the job preferences of
men and women. As a disinterested comment, such action would surely be protected
speech, but the majority concluded that the headings were tied to illegal discrimina-
tion. If an employer advertises for men only, it engages in a discriminatory hiring
practice even though no female applicant is rejected, because the ad assures the
company of no or few female applicants. Because such speech is illegal, a newspaper
may be prohibited from acting as the employer's agent in publishing it. By
establishing sex-segregated column headings, the newspaper encourages employers
who wish to discriminate to use its paper as a means of accomplishing that end. This
practice is profitable to the paper, and thus may be characterized as a deliberate
attempt to make a profit out of a sex-discriminatory transaction. The same remedial
result might be obtained by prohibiting employers from advertising in a newspaper
which used sex-segregated columns. (This approach would prevent the awkward
situation of an order running against the newspaper and would achieve the same
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hinted at a willingness to use a balancing test for commercial
speech, but found that the illegality of the transaction advertised
made reconsideration of the appropriate test for commercial speech
unnecessary, stating that "[a]ny First Amendment interest which
might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal
and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest
supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial
activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is
incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity. ' 133
Justice Douglas' dissent in Pittsburgh Press 34 suggested that
the time had come for a reevaluation of the commercial speech rules.
This suggestion bore fruit in Bigelow v. Virginia.135 Jeffrey Bigelow,
the editor of the Virginia Weekly, published an advertisement in his
newspaper for a New York abortion referral agency and was
convicted under a provision of the Virginia criminal code which
provided: "If any person by publication, lecture, advertisement, or
by the sale or circulation of any publication or in any other manner,
encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion or miscarriage, he
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." 136 After his conviction was
upheld in the Supreme Court of Virginia, the United States Supreme
Court remanded the case for consideration in light of its deci-
sions in Roe v. Wade 37 and Doe v. Bolton,138 which had held
unconstitutional state laws forbidding abortion. After the Virginia
Court reaffirmed Bigelow's conviction on the ground that Roe and
Doe did not deal with abortion advertising, the case was again
appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Court began its consideration by recognizing that commer-
cial advertisements may involve the communication of ideas,
emphasizing that the ideas and information in advertisements may
be of interest to the general public and not just to persons
considering buying the advertiser's product or service:
result of forcing editorial changes in column headings, but at a substantial
administrative cost.) Thus, the majority felt that the Pittsburgh ordinance was
focused on a transaction rather than the suppression of ideas about the propriety of
that transaction.
133. Id. at 389.
134. Id. at 397-99. Justice Douglas' dissent was noted in Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314-15 n.6 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting), which also raised
the question of the appropriate approach to commercial speech.
135. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
136. VA. CODE § 18.1-63 (1960) (repealed 1975).
137. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
138. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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The advertisement published in appellant's newspaper did more
than simply propose a commercial transaction. It contained
factual material of clear "public interest." Portions of its
message, most prominently the lines, "Abortions are now legal
in New York. There are no residency requirements," involve the
exercise of the freedom of communicating information and
disseminating opinion.139
The opinion's apparent stress on material of public interest in
advertisements is probably misleading in that it suggests that the
contents of commercial speech can be regulated unless they are of
"clear public interest," and the Court is unlikely to follow that
suggestion. Most advertisements communicate information - the
claims that the Vega hatchback gets thirty-seven miles per gallon on
highways according to tests by the Environmental Protection
Agency and that the Pinto is the lowest priced American-made car,
for example, are certainly informative. Such statements made in a
noncommercial context between a disinterested third party and an
individual interested in the purchase of a new car would be protected
speech under all the previous decisions of the Court.14 As the
dissenters in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.141 pointed out, a
constitutional test making protection of expression depend on the
court's definition of material of "public interest" would place courts
in the position of establishing what subjects are appropriate for
public discussion. A content-oriented test of constitutional protection
is the antithesis of the Court's first amendment decisions. In the
libel area, the Court has abandoned the distinction (suggested in
Rosenbloom) based on definition of what matters are "of public or
general concern" and reverted to its earlier distinctions between
private individuals and public officials or public figures. 142 The
reluctance of the Court to define matters of public or general concern
for purposes of libel law strongly indicates that it will not attempt to
139. 421 U.S. at 822.
140. Assuming the statements were false, the only law that might apply to prohibit
them would be libel. This in turn assumes that the state law on libel or commercial
disparagement applies to things. In Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court
made it clear that even false statements of fact are constitutionally protected unless
they are made negligently. For a discussion of libel, see Freedom of Speech, supra note
6, at 602-12.
141. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). In Rosenbloom, Justice Marshall, dissenting, pointed out
that if libel law is made to depend on a determination of public interest "courts will be
required to somehow pass on the legitimacy of interest in a particular event or subject;
what information is relevant to self-government. . . . The danger such a doctrine
portends for freedom of the press seems apparent." Id. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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do so in determining the constitutionality of commercial speech
regulation. Thus, the stress on information and ideas of "clear public
interest" in Bigelow may be viewed merely as a demonstration of the
significance of commercial speech for democratic government.
Starting with the proposition that commercial speech may
contain valuable ideas, the Court in Bigelow rejected the notion that
such speech was not protected by the first amendment. It turned
from the definitional process which it had employed in Valentine
and Breard to a balancing test: "a court may not escape the task of
assessing the first amendment interest at stake and weighing it
against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation.' 143
This recognition of balancing as the appropriate test for determining
the constitutionality of regulations of commercial speech may not
result in a radical break from the analysis of Valentine, however.
The Court had held commercial speech unprotected because it was
seen as an integral part of a commercial transaction subject to
regulation. Preventing harm in the commercial transaction will
normally be the "public interest" served in any regulation of
commercial speech, and it will normally outweigh the first amend-
ment interest of the speaker or advertiser. Thus, it appears that most
commercial speech regulation will be upheld under a balancing test
just as such regulation was upheld under Valentine's categorization
approach. On the other hand, a few cases will be resolved against
regulation under the balancing test when the state fails to proffer a
substantial interest.
Although the Bigelow Court referred to balancing the first
amendment interest against the public interest served by the state,
scant attention was actually paid the first amendment interest in
advertising a commercial abortion referral service. Instead, Justice
Blackmun's opinion for the Court focused on the lack of any public
interest to sustain the statute. The Court noted that there was no
claim that the New York abortion referral service affected the
143. 421 U.S. at 826. In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Rels., 413 U.S. 376, 402-03 (1974) (citations omitted), Justice Stewart wrote in dissent:
So long as Members of this Court view the First Amendment as no more than
a set of "values" to be balanced against other "values" that Amendment will
remain in grave jeopardy. ...
Those who think the First Amendment can and should be subordinated to
other socially desirable interests will hail today's decision. But I find it
frightening.
Justice Stewart's position in joining the Bigelow majority casts doubt upon his
repudiation of balancing in Pittsburgh Press.
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quality of medical care in Virginia,1 4 4 that the advertisement was
deceptive or fraudulent, 1 45 or that it related to a commodity or service
that was then illegal in Virginia or New York. 146 Justice Blackmun
thus characterized the state interest as the prevention of its citizens
from hearing about activities beyond its borders, a view arguably
supported by reference to the statute, which on its face forbade
encouraging abortions not merely by advertisements for commercial
referral services but by any "publication, lecture, advertisement or
by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner
.... "147 An attempt to prevent persons from informing others of
their legal rights is on its face an attempt to suppress the idea and is
forbidden by the first amendment. By characterizing the state's
144. 421 U.S. at 827. Thus, the case is distinguishable from Head v. New Mexico
Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963), in which advertising the price of
glasses was forbidden even for out-of-state firms because it might result in poorer
quality glasses sold or marketed by competing in-state firms. Competition among
doctors and medical facilities for abortions was not so keen, especially in view of the
fact that Virginia law prohibited abortions under most circumstances at the time the
advertisement was published.
145. 421 U.S. at 828. The Court may be analogizing to libel here, theorizing that
the utterance of an intentionally deceptive or fraudulent statement is an act intended
to cause harm and that the forbidding of such a statement is a means of controlling
an act within the state, regardless of its extraterritorial reference.
146. Id. The legality of abortion referral services in Virginia is misleading. Most
abortions were illegal in Virginia under state law at the time of Bigelow's conviction.
Thus, there were no Virginia abortion referral services because within the state there
was no legal place for persons wanting abortions to be referred. Under these
circumstances, in-state abortion referral agencies posed no problem and out-of-state
agencies would have no significant effect unless they advertised their services - an
act which, as in Bigelow's case, would bring them within the terms of the statute.
It should also be noted that the service advertised was performed outside the
state and could not have been regulated directly by Virginia. Both the commerce
clause and the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship prevent
Virginia from prohibiting its citizens from using in New York services which are legal
there.
147. VA. CODE § 18.1-63 (1960) (repealed 1975). The statute on its face posed
obvious problems of overbreadth. It surely could not constitutionally be applied to
advocates of abortion who did not themselves engage in any commercial transactions
involving abortion. However, after Bigelow's conviction, the legislature changed the
statute to apply only to urging illegal abortions. The application of the former statute
to Bigelow could not have chilled the first amendment rights of others because this
subsequent amendment made it inapplicable to the acts for which he was convicted.
Thus the Court refused to rule that the overbreadth of the statute was fatal.
The Court could still have employed overbreadth analysis to invalidate the
statute for failure to give Bigelow an adequate warning. As applied in most instances,
the statute was clearly unconstitutional. When he printed the ad, Bigelow knew the
statute as written was contrary to the first amendment, but he could not have been
sure whether it would, or constitutionally could, be applied to his conduct. Thus, the
application of such a broad statute solely to Bigelow's conduct might have been
viewed as a violation of due process.
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interest as preventing its citizens from hearing about their legal
rights, Justice Blackmun was able to conclude that "[t]his asserted
interest, even if understandable, was entitled to little, if any, weight
under the circumstances. '' 4 8
Although Bigelow involved the advertising of a constitutionally
protected right, the Court swiftly made it clear that the balancing
test would apply to commercial speech even when the transaction
advertised was subject to regulation. In Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,149 the Court
struck down Virginia's prohibition on advertising the price of drugs.
The avowed purpose of Virginia's law was to suppress price
competition because such competition results in poorer professional
services. The Court expressed some doubts as to the effectiveness of
the statute in accomplishing this aim in view of the fact that
professional standards are separately regulated. More significantly,
it noted that the state could fix prices for drugs if it feared bad
effects from price competition. By opting instead for suppressing
truthful information, the state was in this sense avoiding regulation
of the underlying transaction. Thus, the Court concluded that a state
may not "completely suppress the dissemination of concededly
truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that
information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients,"' 50
reasoning that "[i]t is precisely this kind of choice, between the
dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if
it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us."1 5'
The shift from a categorization approach to a balancing of
interests test for commercial speech has enabled the Court to
distinguish between laws protecting consumers in commercial
transactions and laws attempting to suppress ideas communicated
by persons engaged in commercial transactions. As a result, the
Court is now likely to afford commercial speech first amendment
protection rather than merely categorizing it as unprotected and,
hence, subject to broad governmental regulation.
This transition is exemplified by the Court's decision in Linmark
Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,152 a case in which a ban
on the use of "for sale" signs was invalidated. Many people might
find great social utility in information on abortion services or the
prices of drugs, but the use of "for sale" signs on property is not
148. 421 U.S. at 828.
149. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
150. Id. at 773.
151. Id. at 770.
152. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
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likely to be accorded as high a place on a scale of social values.
Time, place, and manner restrictions may be valid where the mode of
expression affects a governmental interest unrelated to the content
of speech. Moreover, the limited prohibition of signs on lawns
appeared to be a limit on the place of speech that might be justified
as a valid time, place, and manner restriction of a mode of
expression that affected a governmental interest unrelated to the
content of the speech. The Court, however, discerned that the
restriction applied only to signs having a particular content, and
that it was the content, not the location, that caused the harm the
town council sought to prevent.
As it had done in the pharmacists' case, the Court in Linmark
Associates carefully examined the legitimate interests that a state
may have in regulating commercial speech. The state is, of course,
legitimately concerned with the prevention of illegal activity, but the
sale of a house is perfectly legal. The state may also attempt to
protect a consumer from being injured in a commercial transaction;
when false or misleading statements cause the consumer to enter
into a transaction, they cannot be severed from the commercial act.
No false or misleading statement was involved in Linmark, however,
and the Court concluded that "[t]he Council's concern, then, was not
with any commercial aspect of 'For Sale' signs - with offerors
communicating offers to offerees - but with the substance of the
information communicated to Willingboro citizens." 15 3 As the
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy case had made clear, the
government has no legitimate interest in suppressing ideas and
information out of fear that citizens will take lawful action which is
unwise.
In Carey v. Population Services International,154 New York
attempted to put forth a new state interest to justify suppression of
advertisements: it prohibited the advertising or display of contracep-
tives on the grounds that they are offensive and embarrassing to
those exposed to them. The Court rejected this interest as merely
another attempt to suppress ideas or information because some
people find them distasteful.155
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,15 6 the Court again demon-
strated that it will scrutinize carefully the interest alleged in
regulating commercial speech. The dissenters found that a rule
153. Id. at 96.
154. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
155. Id. at 701-02.
156. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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prohibiting advertising by lawyers protected the public from
misleading statements on the theory that because the services
performed by an attorney are not standardized as are those of the
pharmacist, any mention of prices for services would mislead. The
majority, however, found that the routine legal services mentioned in
the appellants' advertisement were sufficiently standardized and
that, because this speech did not mislead, its prohibition was not
justified.
Recently the Court distinguished the truthful advertising of
legal services involved in Bates from in-person solicitation of clients.
Although a total ban on advertising suggests a desire to suppress
information, a ban on in-person solicitation is more likely an
attempt to protect the consumer from being pressured into accepting
unwanted services. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,157 the
Court explained:
Unlike a public advertisement, which simply provides informa-
tion and leaves the recipient free to act upon it or not, in-person
solicitation may exert pressure and often demands an immediate
response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or
reflection. The aim and effect of in-person solicitation may be to
provide a one-sided presentation and to encourage speedy and
perhaps uninformed decisionmaking; there is no opportunity for
intervention or counter-education by agencies of the Bar,
supervisory authorities, or persons close to the solicited individ-
ual.158
E. Broadcasting Into the Home - " . . Beep . .. Censorship"
A similar governmental interest in protecting the rights of a
potential captive audience was recognized by the Court in FCC V.
Pacifica Foundation,59 in which an order of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission citing the Pacifica Foundation for broadcasting
"indecent" language was upheld. The language in question was a
monologue by comedian George Carlin regarding the use of taboo
words. The monologue was not obscene, as evidenced by the fact
that the Court appeared to have no hesitation in appending a
verbatim transcript of Carlin's monologue to the opinion in the case.
The Court, nevertheless, upheld the FCC order which stated that
sanctions could be imposed for broadcasting such material at two
157. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
158. Id. at 457 (footnote omitted).
159. 438 U.S. 726, reh. denied, 99 S. Ct. 227 (1978).
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o'clock in the afternoon.'r ° The decision was based on two special
factors unique to broadcasting: the broadcast goes into the home and
may affront citizens there before they can change the dial; further, it
is impossible to limit access for children without affecting adults to
some degree. Justices Brennan and Marchsll, dissenting, found
these distinctions unpersuasive. Although they also would have
balanced the speech interest against the individual's right in the
privacy of his home not to be affronted by objectionable matter, the
dissenters insisted that the balance had been struck wrongly: "It
permits majoritarian tastes completely to preclude a protected
message from entering the homes of a receptive unoffended
minority.116' They objected that the Court's balance focused on the
listener who does not want to hear and ignored the listener who is
eager to hear, arguing that
[w]hatever the minimal discomfort suffered by a listener who
inadvertently tunes into a program he finds offensive during the
brief interval before he can simply extend his arm and switch
stations or flick the "off' button, it is surely worth the candle to
preserve the broadcaster's right to send, and the right of those
interested to receive, a message entitled to full First Amendment
protection. 162
Justices Powell and Blackmun subscribed to the opinion of the
Court, emphasizing that the intrusive nature of broadcasting and its
reach to children justified the FCC action. Thus, for the most part,
Justice Stevens' opinion upholding the FCC order was for a majority
of the Court. In one respect, however, Justices Powell and Blackmun
disassociated themselves from Justice Stevens' opinion - they
insisted that the Court cannot decide which speech is most valuable.
Justice Stevens, in a portion of his opinion joined only by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, argued that indecent speech,
like demonstrations and symbols, is not itself an opinion but merely
a mode of communication. Justice Stevens also argued that the
160. Id. at 750-51. The Commission has power under 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(6),
312(b)(2), 503(b)(1)(E) (1976) to impose sanctions for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(1976). That section prohibits the utterance of any "obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication. Pacifica argued that the word
indecent meant obscene and that Carlin's monologue was not obscene because it did
not appeal to the prurient interest of the listener. Over the protests of four dissenters,
the Court majority construed the statutory language disjunctively, as prohibiting
"indecent" speech that was not obscene.
161. 438 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 765-66.
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regulation of indecent language in the broadcast media is wholly
separate from any attempt to suppress ideas:
If there were any reason to believe that the Commission's
characterization of the Carlin monologue as offensive could be
traced to its political content - or even to the fact that it
satirized contemporary attitudes about four letter words - First
Amendment protection might be required. But that is simply not
this case.16 3
The current Court views radio and television as posing a
peculiar problem because, unlike the print media, they are readily
available to children. To the extent that the Commission has focused
on this interest, it has not, in the opinion of the majority, attempted
to suppress ideas generally: "The government's interest, in the 'well
being of its youth' and in supporting 'parents' claim to authority in
their own household' justified the regulation of otherwise protected
expression." 16 4 The dissenters, on the other hand, assumed that
because the materials were not obscene as to children, they were
protected speech with respect to children. Yet, as with material that
is obscene only as to children, indecent language may appeal to the
child for reasons unrelated to particular points of view. It may be
sought after (and used) simply for shock value. For these reasons the
majority included it within the category of speech which may be
given different treatment for juveniles.
II. REGULATION FOR SPEECH REASONS
It is often difficult to distinguish the pavement to hell from the
pathway to heaven.
Many laws prohibit certain speech or condition the legality of
speech on further speech not desired by the speaker. The most
common example, the propriety of which has never been seriously
questioned, is procedural rules designed to allow speakers to proceed
in turn. 6 5 While opposing points of view must be permitted, no ideas
could be understood or rationally dealt with in a cacophony of
conflicting voices. The confusion must be dissipated before expres-
sion can be effective. Rules of order, although they may temporarily
163. Id. at 746
164. Id. at 749.
165. "No one has ever argued that speech should be free of the restraints of
reasonable parliamentary rules ... ." Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox
v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 23. See also A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 5, at
24-28.
[VOL. 38
BALANCING FREEDOM OF SPEECH
silence a particular speaker, are necessary to prevent opposing
speakers from using speech to suppress ideas.
166
Another rule that deters some speech in order to promote speech
interests is the "fairness doctrine" in radio and television. The
Communications Act directs the FCC to grant broadcast licenses
and renewals on a finding "that public interest, convenience, and
necessity would be served .... "167 Pursuant to its charge to base
renewals on the "public interest," the FCC requires each broadcaster
to cover controversial issues of public importance and to do so in a
fair manner, presenting opposing viewpoints on each issue.16  The
obligation to present opposing views is not affected by the inability
to find commercial sponsorship to pay for airing those views, and
broadcasters have objected that this fact requires them to subsidize
opposing views in two ways. First, if a broadcaster wishes to take a
position on a controversial issue, it must also present the views of
persons who disagree. Second, it is possible that the broadcaster will
end up having to pay for the expression with which it disagrees. In
order to avoid providing opposing views with an opportunity to be
heard, and especially to avoid bearing the costs of airing those
views, broadcasters may avoid making any statement on the
issue. 169 Further, the fairness doctrine is enforced by a governmental
agency, which raises the possibility of strict enforcement when the
government is attacked and lax enforcement when a controversial
government policy is explained and promoted. 7 0 Thus, the potential
for suppressing ideas critical of the government is inherent in the
"fairness" doctrine.
At the same time, allowing broadcasters to do as they please
may also result in suppression of ideas.' 7 ' In the broadcast media,
166. [Clonduct that obstructs or seriously impedes the utterance of another, even
though verbal in form, cannot be classified as expression. Rather it is the
equivalent of sheer noise. It has the same effect, in preventing or disrupting
communication, as acts of physical force. Consequently it must be deemed
action and is not covered by the First Amendment.
T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 338.
167. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976).
168. In addition to the presentation of opposing views on controversial issues,
broadcasters are bound to provide a right of reply to a person who is personally
attacked during the discussion of a controversial public issue. See text accompanying
notes 174 to 177 infra. Further, the statute requires broadcasters to afford "equal
opportunities" to candidates for public office. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). See generally
H. NELSON AND D. TEETER, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 411-15 (1969).
169. See Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on
Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768, 773-74 (1972).
170. Cf. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 148-70 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the Fairness Doctrine generally).
171. See Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1641, 1642 (1967).
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the government licenses one person or company to operate a station.
If the licensor presents only his views and dissenters are unable to
obtain a license, the effect of his monopoly is to suppress the ideas of
others. Licensing provides the same opportunity for political
favoritism as does the fairness doctrine. The government inevitably
shuts off some speech, either directly, by regulating the broadcaster,
or indirectly, by giving him an unregulated monopoly. Into this
damned-if-you-do and damned-if-you-don't situation, the Supreme
Court has ventured.
In the seminal case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,172 two
aspects of the fairness doctrine were challenged in the Court. The
first was the requirement that coverage of public issues accurately
reflect opposing views. The requirement applies even if sponsors are
not found for such views, and even if no outside organization has
produced a program so that the broadcaster itself must present the
opposing view. 173 Also under scrutiny were the "personal attack
rules," which provided that a figure attacked in the course of
discussing a public issue must be given an opportunity to respond
personally. Writing for the Court, Justice White sustained these
regulations on the theory that:
[t]here is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the
Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency
with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with
obligations to present those views and voices which are
representative of his community and which would otherwise, by
necessity, be barred from the air waves.
... It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters which is paramount. 74
172. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Red Lion was actually two cases. In the first, the Radio
and Television News Directors Association challenged the fairness and personal
attack rules on their face. The second case involved the application of the personal
attack rule to Red Lion Broadcasting Company's refusal to provide author Fred Cook
with a free opportunity to reply to an attack made on him on a sponsored television
show.
173. See generally Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
174. 395 U.S. at 389-90. Justice White's opinion is somewhat unclear here, for if
the broadcaster is acting as a proxy, it must be on behalf of others who wish to use the
airwaves. Discussion of listeners' rights is an entirely separate matter. If the proxy
concept was the basis for decision, the fairness doctrine seems a mechanism for
preventing licensing to be used to prefer particular ideas. If listeners' rights are truly
paramount, the rationale would support a wide variety of reply legislation in other
media.
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In response to the broadcasters' contention that the fairness doctrine
reduced discussion of public issues, 175 Justice White pointed out that
Federal Communications Commission rules compelled broadcasters
to engage in such discussion, and noted that "if experience with the
administration of these doctrines indicates that they have the net
effect of reducing rather than enhancing the volume and quality of
coverage, there will be time enough to reconsider the constitutional
implications." 176 Ultimately, the Court relied on the scarcity of
licenses and the promotion of a wider range of speech in upholding
this regulation of broadcast speech:
In view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Govern-
ment's role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate
claims of those unable without governmental assistance to gain
access to those frequencies for expression of their views, we hold
the regulation and ruling at issue here are both authorized by
statute and constitutional. 177
The fairness doctrine alone does not assure a hearing for all
points of view. On most issues, there are more than two different
views. In addition, the fairness doctrine generally permits the
broadcaster, rather than an advocate, to present opposing views,
and the statement of a view by a broadcaster opposed to it will
usually be less powerful than the statement that an advocate would
make. Unless the media give individuals a right of access, some
viewpoints will not be heard. Many stations, however, have refused
to accept advertisements on controversial political issues in order to
avoid the implications of the fairness doctrine; for if they broadcast
one point of view, they might be forced to give free time to opposing
views. The FCC permitted this policy of the stations, but the Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia held that the stations' refusal to
sell editorial time to organizations wishing to expound their views
on critical issues infringed upon the first amendment rights of such
175. It is strenuously argued, however, that if political editorials or personal
attacks will trigger an obligation in broadcasters to afford the opportunity for
expression to speakers who need not pay for time and whose views are
unpalatable to the licensees, then broadcasters will be irresistibly forced to
self-censorship and their coverage of controversial public issues will be
eliminated or at least rendered wholly ineffective.
Id. at 392-93.
176. Id. at 393.
177. Id. at 400-01 (footnote omitted). References to claims of access suggest that
despite Justice White's reference to listeners' rights, the Court was more concerned
with the effect of limited access to cut off expression by nonlicensees.
19791
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
groups.178 In CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,1 79 the
Court reversed the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit and
allowed broadcasters to exercise their editorial judgment to accept or
reject paid editorial advertisements so long as they fulfilled the
general requirements of the fairness doctrine to give adequate and
"fair" coverage to public issues. In so doing, the CBS Court, per
Chief Justice Burger, first reiterated the fairness-doctrine principle
that the public must be provided with a balanced presentation on
issues of public importance. Looking to the legislative history of the
regulation of the airwaves, the Court discerned a clear intention that
a substantial measure of journalistic independence for the broadcast
licensee be maintained - "that broadcast licensees are not to be
treated as common carriers, obliged to accept whatever is tendered
by members of the public."'1' Given this concept of journalistic
autonomy, the Chief Justice concluded that the independent actions
of the broadcasters at issue did not constitute governmental action
and thus were not violative of the first amendment. Justice Stewart
concurred in this portion of the opinion, analogizing the first
amendment rights of broadcasters to those of the press - the
protection from governmental interference rather than subjection to
full first amendment strictures as government.' 8 '
Chief Justice Burger also believed that requiring stations to take
such advertisements would enlarge governmental control of the
media and would pose far more serious threats to free speech than
would a paucity of political advertisements. Because controversial
issues must, under the fairness doctrine, be discussed by licensees in
some form or manner, Justice Burger concluded that the question
was not "whether there is to be discussion of controversial issues of
public importance on the broadcast media, but rather who shall
determine what issues are to be discussed by whom and when."' 8 2 In
answering this question, he concluded that Congress could approp-
riately leave that decision to licensees and that such a policy would
178. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (rehearing denied), rev'd sub noma. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973).
179. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
180. Id. at 116.
181. Justice Stewart stated: "To hold that broadcaster action is governmental
action would thus simply strip broadcasters of their own First Amendment rights."
Id. at 139 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justices Powell and Blackmun found it
unnecessary to decide the state action point, while Justice Douglas assumed no
governmental action despite his previous arguments which point the other way. Id. at
150 (Douglas, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 130. See also Jaffe, supra note 169, at 787-89.
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in fact best serve the public interest, for were access to the airwaves
determined on a first come first served basis, the control over the
treatment of public issues would be transferred from the licensees,
who are held accountable to the FCC, to the whim of private
individuals who are not. i8 3 In this conclusion he was joined by
Justices White, Powell and Blackmun. Justice Douglas argued not
only that Congress could leave the decision to private licensees, but
that it was compelled by the first amendment to do so, thus
indicating his disagreement even with the limited governmental
regulation permitted under Red Lion.i8 4
Justice Brennan, in an opinion joined by Justice Marshall,
dissented. He argued that the interests of the people as a whole in
receiving the full spectrum of views should prevail over the first
amendment rights of the broadcast licensees. Moreover, he con-
tended that there is an independent first amendment interest in
effective self-expression that must be considered in the proper
balancing of conflicting first amendment claims. The dissent also
pointed out that the government had conferred on broadcasters the
power to refuse access to other groups seeking to use a broadcast
frequency. Consequently, the dissenters reasoned, the government is
responsible when broadcasters refuse to permit political advertise-
ments. Contrary to the view of Justice Douglas, they found no
abridgment of speech in requiring broadcasters to accept political
advertisements, stating: "we are concerned here not with the speech
of the broadcasters themselves but, rather, with their 'right' to decide
which other individuals will be given an opportunity to speak in a
forum that has already been opened to the public."' 85 After
acknowledging that implementation of their view might raise
problems of favoritism of the wealthy who can afford political
advertisements, impairment of the fairness doctrine and enlarge-
ment of governmental control over content, the dissenters argued
that these problems were speculative and might be met by the
Commission and licensees in future regulations.'86
183. 412 U.S. at 124-25.
184. "I did not participate in that decision [Red Lion] and, with all respect, would
not support it." Id. at 154 (Douglas, J., concurring). Regretfully, Justice Douglas never
faced up to the problems created by the need for government allocation of broadcast
frequencies in the first instance, but rather viewed the issue solely in the time frame of
the regulation of existing, licensed, broadcasters. He could justify this by disputing
the scarcity theory since with cable television and UHF there seem to be a sufficient
number of frequencies for all despite Justice White's contrary conclusion in Red Lion.
185. Id. at 199-200 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).
186. Id. at 202-03.
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While the CBS majority perceived no intent to suppress ideas in
the lack of regulation, the dissent argued that the government was
simply allowing others to suppress them. To a great degree, then, the
disagreement on the Court revolved around (in addition to the extent
to which the government is responsible for the licensees' refusal to
accept political advertising) whether that policy promotes or defeats
the interests of freedom of expression. When the interest served by
the law is allegedly the promotion of expression, the Court will
decide whether that interest is in fact advanced. A majority seemed
willing to give the government the benefit of the doubt in CBS, but
Justices Brennan and Marshall were not.
Although the Court has upheld governmental regulation when,
in broadcasting, the nature of the media forced government into an
active licensing role, it has struck down regulatory legislation
dealing with newspapers. By leaving the press essentially unregu-
lated, the government has avoided considering the content of
newspapers and thus avoided any suspicion of the suppression of
ideas. The monopoly power of large newspapers, however, enables
them to suppress ideas. Nevertheless, when Florida enacted
legislation requiring papers to give a right of reply to any candidate
for public office whose personal character or official record was
attacked - a variation of the broadcast media's fairness doctrine -
the Court, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,8 7 unani-
mously struck it down as violative ot the first amendment. Chief
Justice Burger, who delivered the opinion of the Court, explained:
the Court has expressed sensitivity as to whether a restriction or
requirement constituted the compulsion exerted by government
on a newspaper to print that which it would not otherwise print.
The clear implication has been that any such a compulsion to
publish that which "'reason' tells them should not be published"
is unconstitutional.188
In addition to the fatal flaw of compelling persons to state ideas
abhorrent to them, the Court found that the Florida statute would be
likely to defeat rather than promote expression:
187. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
188. Id. at 256. Forcing speech against the speaker's will operates to suppress ideas
in two ways. First, by its nature it suppresses the idea that the speaker disagrees with
the ideas expressed. Second, a forced statement of opposing ideas tends to suppress
the original idea both by making it less likely that the original idea will be expressed
and by constantly undermining it.
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Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper
that published news or commentary arguably within the reach
of the right-of-access statute, editors might well conclude that
the safe course is to avoid controversy. Therefore, under the
operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage
would be blunted or reduced. Government-enforced right of
access inescapably "dampens the vigor and limits the variety of
public debate .... ,189
Moreover, a rule compelling the paper to print replies would reduce
the space available for publication of matters that the publisher
would otherwise have printed in his editorial discretion. 19°
Although the government is inescapably involved in regulation
of the broadcast media, such regulation of newspapers is not
inherently necessary. This makes the Court suspicious of any
legislation directed at the printed word, and willing to erect a tough
barrier to prevent government suppression of ideas in the print
media. Nevertheless, the Court did indicate some openness to later
argument, for Justice Burger framed his conclusion in burden-of-
proof terms: "It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental
regulation of this crucial process [editorial judgment as to newspaper
content] can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guaran-
tees of a free press as they have evolved to this time." 19'
189. Id. at 257 (footnote and citations omitted).
190. Id. at 256. This same argument might appear equally applicable to the
broadcast media. Communication depends on sponsorship, and neither a newspaper
nor a broadcast station can afford to publish or air more material than can be
sponsored. On the other hand, the general requirements of fairness in the broadcast
industry upheld in Red Lion are justified because the government is shutting off
access to media to nonstation owners by the very act of allocating stations. Because
the government is not involved in allocating newspaper ownership, it has no clear
basis for conditioning publication on compliance with its ideas of what ought be
published.
191. Id. at 258. Justices Brennan and Rehnquist concurred in a separate opinion
which stated that the decision did not take a position on "retraction" statutes, which
require a paper to print a retraction of a defamatory falsehood. Justice White's
concurrence emphasized the impact of Tornillo on libel law. His criticism of Gertz, see
note 140 supra, in the Tornillo concurrence is that the combination leaves "people at
the complete mercy of the press." Justice White had argued in his dissent in Gertz
that an action should lie for any harmful false statement about a private person, for if
it did not, the injured person could not vindicate his or her reputation. This suggests
he would find even retraction statutes defective under Tornillo.
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III. SPEECH AS EVIDENCE OF UNFITNESS
No one cares how much you object as long as you are not in a
position to do something about it.
The balancing test is also used when the government attempts
to prevent injury to its operations by prohibiting persons with
certain beliefs from obtaining positions of employment from which
they might engage in harmful conduct. Here the government does
not attempt to prevent speech per se, but rather uses the speech as
an indicator of whether a person will perform his job properly or,
conversely, in a manner deleterious to the interests of the govern-
ment. Judicial contention in this area has centered on the degree of
deference to be accorded the causal linkage asserted to exist between
speech and action. If the employment requirement at issue is
narrowed to a test that demonstrates a high likelihood that the
applicant will misuse his position, the Court will sustain it. An
unfortunate application of this analysis is American Communica-
tions Association v. Douds.192
In order for labor organizations to secure advantages under the
National Labor Relations Act, their officers were required by section
9(h) of the act to file affidavits that they were not members of the
Communist Party. That section also required the affiants to swear
that they did not believe in, were not members of and did not support
any organization that believes in, or teaches the overthrow of, the
United States government by force or by any illegal or unconstitu-
tional method. The Court pointed out that this legislation was not
directed at suppressing the speech of communists - "[s]ection 9(h) is
designed to protect the public not against what Communists and
others identified therein advocate or believe, but against what
Congress has concluded they have done and are likely to do
again"'193 - but recognized that the law had a tendency to restrain
192. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
193. Id. at 396. Another example of a law aimed at preventing future conduct
which is evidenced by present words is 18 U.S.C. §871(a) (1976), which prohibits
"knowingly and willfully... [making] any threat to take the life of or inflict bodily
harm upon the President of the United States." In Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.
705 (1969) (per curiam), the Court reversed a conviction for violation of the statute on
the ground that the statements of defendant were "political hyperbole" and not a true
threat, but avoided deciding whether the statute is violated when such a threat is
accompanied by an "apparent" determination to carry it out, or only when the
speaker in fact intended to carry it out. When the issue arose again in Rogers v.
United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975), the Court again avoided a decision based on
statutory interpretation, reversing the conviction on the grounds of prejudicial error
because the trial court had given instructions to the jury without notifying the
defendant or his counsel.
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speech and that first amendment arguments therefore had to be
considered:
In essence, the problem is one of weighing the probable effects of
the statute upon the free exercise of the right of speech and
assembly against the congressional determination that political
strikes are evils of conduct which cause substantial harm to
interstate commerce and that Communists and others identified
by § 9(h) pose continuing threats to that public interest when in
positions of union leadership.194
In balancing these interests, the Court gave great weight to its belief
that Congress was attempting to deal with an evil other than ideas:
"[W]e have here no statute which is either frankly aimed at the
suppression of dangerous ideas nor one which, although ostensibly
aimed at the regulation of conduct, may actually 'be made the
instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views.' "195
The Court concluded that the statute could not have been used as an
instrument of suppression because persons affected could continue to
hold their beliefs without punishment if they gave up their positions
in the labor movement, and only a small number of persons with
these beliefs were affected by the statute. 196
In 1950 the Court appeared willing to sustain any loyalty
requirement that the legislature could rationally conclude might
prevent harmful conduct by holders of particular jobs; it consistently
upheld statutes that denied employment on the basis of membership
in certain organizations. Thus, a requirement that candidates for
public office in Maryland swear that they were not engaged "in one
way or another in the attempt to overthrow the government by force
or violence," and that they were not knowingly a member of an
organization engaged in such an attempt was upheld in Gerende v.
194. 339 U.S. at 400.
195. 339 U.S. at 402-03 (footnote and citations omitted).
196. Id. at 404. When the purpose of a statute is clearly to suppress an idea, the
Court has not considered how many people are directly affected by the statute. Even if
the statute is purportedly based on an interest unrelated to the suppression of ideas, it
will not be insulated from careful judicial review because it applies to only a small
number of people; if it could be insulated on this ground, the cumulative effect of
several separate laws might stifle expression. Nevertheless, the Court may, as it did in
Douds, find some support for its belief that the statute furthers an interest unrelated
to speech when only a small proportion of those holding an idea are affected by the
statute. When, as in Garner, see text accompanying notes 198 & 199 infra, public
employment is involved, many people are affected by restrictions. This greater impact
on expression, however, was weighed by the Court against the greater need the
government has in insuring the proper performance of its functions.
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Board of Supervisors.19 7 Similarly, in Garner v. Board of Public
Works, 198 the Court upheld a requirement that all employees of the
city of Los Angeles take an oath that they had neither advised,
advocated or taught the violent overthrow of the government within
the previous five years, nor been a member of any organization that
did so.199 And in Adler v. Board of Education,200 the Court upheld the
"Feinberg Law," which applied a loyalty test to public school
teachers in New York and permitted teachers to be
denied . . . the privilege of working for the school system of the
State of New York because, first, of their advocacy of the
overthrow of the government by force or violence, or, secondly,
by unexplained membership in an organization found by the
school authorities, after notice and hearing, to teach and
advocate the overthrow of the government by force and violence,
and known by such persons to have such purpose. 20 1
The Court held that this system did not deny one such teacher any
rights under the first amendment:
His freedom of choice between membership in the organization
and employment in the school system might be limited, but not
his freedom of speech or assembly, except in the remote sense
that limitation is inherent in every choice. Certainly such
limitation is not one the state may not make in the exercise of its
police power to protect the schools from pollution and thereby to
defend its own existence. 20 2
197. 341 U.S. 56, 56-57 (1951) (emphasis omitted).
198. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
199. I further swear (or affirm) that I do not advise, advocate or teach, and have
not within the period beginning five (5) years prior to the effective date of the
ordinance requiring the making of this oath or affirmation, advised,
advocated or taught, the overthrow by force, violence or other unlawful
means, of the Government of the United States of America or of the State of
California and that I am not now and have not, within said period, been or
become a member of or affiliated with any group, society, association,
organization or party which advises, advocates or teaches, or has, within said
period, advised, advocated or taught, the overthrow by force, violence or other
unlawful means of the Government of the United States of America or of the
State of California.
Id. at 718-19.
200. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
201. Id. at 492.
202. Id. at 493. The New York system upheld in Adler was subsequently repudiated
in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), see note 212 infra.
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During the same year that the Court decided Adler, it took its
first steps towards limiting the use of loyalty tests as a condition of
employment. Rather than directly employing the balancing test to
strike down legislation that focused on speech as an indicator of
unfitness, the Court began to invalidate such laws through an
application of the overbreadth doctrine, finding them too broadly
drafted to indicate a sufficiently strong causal link with the interest
asserted.2 3 More narrowly drawn statutes are rarely as effective in
preventing people likely to abuse their position from holding office.
Statistically, the percentage of people who would use their position
to harm the government is likely to be higher in a group drawn from
members of the Communist Party than from another, random,
sampling of the population, and it is very difficult, for example, to
prove that someone has knowledge of an organization's illegal ends
and particularly that such person has the specific intent to further
those ends. Because of such problems of proof, the overbroad statute,
which imposes some disability because of associational activity, is
likely to have an incremental effect on national security. At the
same time, however, it cuts many people off from employment
although the likelihood of their being unsatisfactory employees is
small. Thus, the Court's more recent use of overbreadth in this
context has been inextricably linked to a balancing analysis.
In Wieman v. Updegraff,2 4 the case which marks the beginning
of the use of overbreadth analysis to limit the use of loyalty oaths,
the Court was faced with an oath that Oklahoma's highest court had
construed to exclude persons from government service "solely on the
basis of organizational membership, regardless of their knowledge
concerning the organizations to which they had belonged. '205 The
Court held the oath requirement invalid under the overbreadth
doctrine, pointing out that "innocent" membership in an organiza-
tion posed no danger to the state: "Indiscriminate classification of
innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary
power. The oath offends due process." 20 6 By including speech and
association that supplied no evidence of potential for harmful
conduct, the oath raised suspicion that it was directed at ideas rather
than the protection of the public from harmful conduct. After
Wieman, the Court applied the ancillary doctrine in an increasingly
more stringent manner when analyzing such oaths.
203. See Ancillary Doctrines, supra note 9, at 705-14 for a discussion of
overbreadth.
204. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
205. Id. at 190.
206. Id. at 191.
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In Shelton v. Tucker,20 7 the Court struck down a requirement
that teachers list all their associational ties because such a listing
could deter associational rights under the first amendment despite
the fact that "[m]any such relationships could have no possible
bearing upon the teacher's occupational competence or fitness. ' ' 20
8
The Court explained that:
even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridg-
ment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for
achieving the same basic purpose.20 9
An even more stringent application of the overbreadth doctrine
was made in Elfbrandt v. Russell, 210 in which state employees of
Arizona were subject to discharge for being knowing members of the
Communist Party or any other organization which had as its
purpose the overthrow by force or violence of the state or federal
government. In striking down the statute, the Court pointed out that
a knowing member who did not personally subscribe to the illegal
purposes of the party would pose no danger to the state: "Those who
join an organization but do not share its unlawful purposes and who
do not participate in its unlawful activities surely pose no threat,
either as citizens or as public employees."' 21' Thus, the Elfbrandt
Court concluded that "[a] law which applies to membership without
the 'specific intent' to further the illegal aims of the organization
infringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms. It rests on the
doctrine of 'guilt by association'....11112
The overbreadth doctrine has also been applied in the area of
national security. In Aptheker v. Secretary of State,213 the Court was
faced with a federal law that prohibited application for a United
States passport by any member of a communist organization that
207. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
208. Id. at 488.
209. Id. (footnotes omitted).
210. 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
211. Id. at 17.
212. Id. at 19 (citations omitted). The extent to which the Court's resort to ancillary
doctrines rather than direct balancing of interests has led to greater protection for
expression is illustrated by Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). In that
case, the Court struck down a New York statute which had, in substantially the same
form, been upheld in Adler. Instead of overruling Adler, however, the Keyishian Court
distinguished it on the basis that the parties there had not attacked the statute as
being unconstitutionally vague. See Ancillary Doctrines, supra note 9, at 717.
213. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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was required to register by a final order of the Subversive Activities
Control Board. The Court noted that the law applied to both
knowing members and those who did not know that the organization
with which they were associated was a "communist" organization or
that it sought to further the aims of the world communist movement
and that it did not take into account the member's degree of activity
in the organization or commitment to its purpose. Similarly, the
statute applied regardless of the purpose of the proposed travel or the
country to which the individual desired to go. On these facts the
Aptheker Court decided that national security could be protected by
a more narrowly drawn statute. 214
Innocent membership in an illegal organization does not suggest
illegal action; similarly, abstract rhetoric can be dismissed as such
an indicator. A specific purpose to overthrow the government by
violence is, however, a sufficient indicator that the individual would
use an influential position to act. Because there has been no overt
act, an individual with such a purpose may not be proceeded against
criminally,215 but he may be subject to disability legislation that is
directed at the possibility of action and not speech. Thus, in Baird v.
State Bar of Arizona216 and In re Stolar,217 the Court invalidated
state requirements that applicants for admission to the bar state
whether they had been a member of an organization that advocates
the overthrow of the government of the United States by force.
Justice Stewart, concurring in both cases in a swing opinion, wrote
in Baird:
Our decisions have made clear that such inquiry must be
confined to knowing membership to satisfy the First and
Fourteenth Amendments .... It follows from these decisions
that mere membership in an organization can never, by itself, be
sufficient ground for a state's imposition of civil disabilities or
criminal punishment. Such membership can be quite different
from knowing membership in an organization advocating the
overthrow of the Government by force or violence, on the part of
one sharing the specific intent to further the organization's
illegal goals. 21
214. Id. at 514.
215. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957). See also the discussion of the clear and present danger test in
Freedom of Speech, supra note 6, at 563-73.
216. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
217. 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
218. 401 U.S. at 9 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice
Stewart also concurred in In re Stolar, 401 U.S. at 31. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Blackmun, Harlan and White dissented in these two cases on the ground that
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In Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v.
Wadmond,219 on the other hand, the Court upheld questions on New
York's bar application that were used to decide whether an applicant
complied with a rule mandating a belief in the form of, and loyalty
to, the government of the United States. The questions asked
whether the applicant had ever been a member of an organization
knowing that it advocated or taught that the federal or state
government should be overturned by unlawful means, and, if so,
whether the applicant had the specific intent to further such aims.
The Wadmond Court found that such questions were precisely
tailored to discovering the type of knowing membership that
previous cases had held was criminally punishable, 220 and indicated
that knowing membership in a society advocating unlawful acts was
sufficient evidence that the member would use bar admission at
some later time to commit such acts.
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, dissented from this
portion of the opinion on the ground that the question was overbroad
because it did not specify that the organization's advocacy be
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and that it
be likely to do so. 22 1 A dissenting opinion by Justices Marshall and
Brennan stated that such questions constituted "an indiscriminate
and highly intrusive device designed to expose an applicant's
political affiliations to the scrutiny of screening authorities. ' 2 2 They
focused on the vice of the first question, which asked about knowing
membership without specific intent to accomplish the unlawful aims
of the group, and concluded that, taken together, the questions
affected discussion more than necessary to protect against misuse of
position because advocacy of revolution in the far distant future pre-
sented no likelihood of immediate acts.22 3
the questions asked merely comprised part of the groundwork for further investiga-
tion into the applicant's character.
219. 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
220. Id. at 165. It should be noted that the Court posited that had the plain
language of the rule been the only evidence before it, more substantial constitutional
questions might have been raised. Given the state committee's narrow construction of
the questions - placing the burden of proof on the government, interpreting "form of
government" to refer only to the federal and state constitutions and restricting
"belief' and "loyalty" to the taking of an oath of loyalty to those constitutions - the
Court had little trouble upholding them. It viewed the questions thus interpreted as
constituting no more than a reasonable means of ascertaining that the applicant was
not summarily taking an oath with which he actually disagreed. Id. at 162-64.
221. Id. at 184 (Black, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 196 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
223. Id.
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In Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb 224 the state of
Indiana had required as a prerequisite to gaining a place on the
ballot that the officers of a political party or organization file an
affidavit that it did not "advocate the overthrow of local, state or
national government by force or violence .... "225 The Communist
Party of Indiana challenged this requirement, but a three-judge court
upheld it.226 The party then filed an affidavit which tracked the
statute, but added:
The term advocate as used herein has the meaning given it by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 at 320, the advocacy and teaching of
concrete action for the forcible overthrow of the government, and
not of principles divorced from action."2 27
The election board rejected the affidavit for failure to meet the
statutory requirements on the theory that the statute required the
oath-taker to forswear even the abstract doctrine that the govern-
ment should be overthrown. Prior cases had made it clear that such
an oath could not be required of a public official in a non-sensitive
position, 28 but the state argued that those cases did not apply to
elected positions because advocacy of the overthrow of government
by force is incompatible with the use of democratic procedures. The
Court responded by pointing out the devastating effect such a
limitation would have - "'[o]ther rights, even the most basic, are
illusory if the right to vote is undermined' "229 - and by suggesting
that a group could be barred from the ballot only if it urged illegal
action rather than overthrow as abstract doctrine.230
224. 414 U.S. 441 (1974). This was the first case in which the Court addressed the
problem of loyalty oaths for elective officials in a full opinion since affirming
Maryland's oath in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
225. 414 U.S. 442-43.
226. Id. at 444. The opinion of the lower court was not reported.
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 231 to 235 infra.
229. Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 450 (1974) (quoting
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964)). Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist concurred in the result on the ground
that such an affidavit was not required of Republican and Democratic parties and
thus improperly discriminated in violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. He did not pass on the first amendment objections although
he noted that Yates and its progeny might not control. Id. at 453 n.3 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
230. Id. at 450. Advocacy of a doctrine of violent overthrow is not itself illegal, and
it is indeed doubtful that a known advocate would ever succeed at the polls. Moreover,
success might make it even more unlikely that the doctrine would be converted to
action, as a successful candidate would be likely to perceive the democratic process as
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Even in areas more closely related to the national security, the
Court has applied the overbreadth doctrine and, in the process, has
accorded significant weight to the protected associational rights of
employees. In United States v. Robel,23" for example, it struck down
a statute that made any employment in a defense facility unlawful
for a member of an organization under a final order to register with
the Subversive Activities Control Board. The Court reaffirmed the
government's power to keep from sensitive positions persons who
would disrupt national defense, but found that this statute affected
persons who posed no such danger 2:12 and warned that the concept of
the "national defense" statute could not be viewed as an end in and
of itself justifying any use of congressional power. When the means
chosen cut deeply into an employee's right of association and forced
him to make a choice between surrendering his organizational
affiliation and giving up his job, the majority required a more
narrowly drafted statute.
Justices White and Harlan dissented on the ground that the
danger of acts resulting from persons like Robel was greater than
the Court thought. According to the dissenters, "[s]ome Party
members may be no threat at all, but many of them undoubtedly are,
and it is exceedingly difficult to identify those in advance of the very
events which Congress seeks to avoid. ' 283 Accordingly, they would
have struck the balance in favor of the governmental determination
that the interest of the employee in remaining a member of the
Communist Party was less substantial than the public interest in
a preferable alternative means to his goal of changing society. If a candidate urged
specific illegal acts, however, his election might place him in a position to violate the
law in the manner he had suggested or in a similar fashion. Thus, the danger of
action by an advocate of specific illegal acts might be sufficiently great to justify a
law preventing such a person from obtaining elective office because the law might be
perceived as directed at illegal acts rather than criticism of the government.
231. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
232. That statute casts its net across a broad range of associational activities,
indiscriminately trapping membership which can be constitutionally pun-
ished and membership which cannot be so proscribed. It is made irrelevant to
the statute's operation that an individual may be a passive or inactive
member of a designated organization, that he may be unaware of the
organization's unlawful aims, or that he may disagree with those unlawful
aims. It is also made irrelevant that an individual who is subject to the
penalties of §5(a)(1)(D) may occupy a nonsensitive position in a defense
facility. Thus § 5(a)(1)(D) contains the fatal defect of overbreadth because it
seeks to bar employment both for association which may be proscribed and
for association which may not be proscribed consistently with First
Amendment rights.
Id. at 265-66 (footnotes omitted).
233. Id. at 287 (White, J., dissenting).
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excluding him from employment in the defense industry. In reaching
this conclusion Justices White and Harlan relied heavily on their
view that the executive and legislative branches were better able to
determine what constitutes a threat to the national security and that
the statute's effect on general associational rights was minimal.3 4
The Robel majority abjured balancing because they did not
believe it proper for the Court to label one substantial interest as
more important than another. Rather, given the clear conflict
between two valid goals, the Court viewed its role as one of
determining whether Congress had adopted constitutional means to
achieve those goals: "we have found it necessary to measure the
validity of the means adopted by Congress against both the goal it
has sought to achieve and the specific prohibitions of the First
Amendment. But we have in no way 'balanced' those respective
interests.''2:15 Thus, the Robel Court did not balance the general
interest in national security against the interest of freedom of
speech; the Court did balance interests, however, in the context of its
overbreadth analysis. The governmental interest balanced was not
the general interest in national security, but rather the need for the
statute at issue, with its effect on free speech, as opposed to a more
narrowly drafted (and hence less restrictive) law. The marginal
utility of the statute challenged in Robel was slight when viewed in
this manner, and it was that marginal utility that was weighed
against the statute's effect on free speech. In the words of the Court
in O'Brien, such a law will be upheld only "if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of [the legitimate governmental]
interest."236
While most of the cases discussed above have involved denial of
employment predicated upon speech that suggested the speaker
would have used his official position to disrupt governmental
234. Id. In refuting the majority's reliance on Aptheker and Scales, see text
accompanying notes 213 & 214 supra, the dissent stated that
denying the opportunity to be employed in some defense plants is a much
smaller deterrent to the exercise of associational rights than denial of a
passport or a criminal penalty attached solely to membership, and the
Government's interest in keeping potential spies and saboteurs from defense
plants is much greater than its interest in keeping disloyal Americans from
traveling abroad or in committing all Party members to prison. The "delicate
and difficult" judgment to which the Court refers should thus result in a
different conclusion from that reached in the Scales and Aptheker cases.
Id. at 288.
235. Id. at 268 n.20. See Gunther, Reflections on Robel: It's Not What the Court
Did, But the Way That It Did It, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1140 (1968).
236. 391 U.S. at 377.
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operations, situations may also arise in which employees are
discharged for speech that indicates political differences with
superiors. When the employee's job involves policy decisions,
political views opposed to superiors may be viewed as inconsistent
with the nature of the job. In Elrod v. Burns, 237 various officials of
the Cook County Democratic organization were sued for dismissing
Republican non-civil-service employees upon assumption of office.
The defendants justified this patronage practice as necessary to
ensure effective government by promoting the efficiency and
political loyalty of public employees so as to guarantee that repre-
sentative government would not be undercut by obstructive tactics.
Justice Powell, in dissent, was impressed with this interest, stating
that patronage positions enhanced the democratic process by
stimulating political activity and thereby making government more
accountable.2 3 8 In addition, Justice Powell pointed out that patron-
age provided incentives to work for candidates for lesser offices. 239 In
balancing these interests against the protected associational rights
incident to employment, he believed that, in light of the limited role
that patronage plays in governmental hiring, the awarding of jobs
on a patronage basis did not constitute an impermissible abridgment
of free speech. 240
The majority, on the other hand, argued that a person's political
views are irrelevant to his motivation or quality of performance in
jobs that do not involve the formulation of policy, that inefficiency
results from the wholesale replacement of large numbers of public
employees, and that patronage encourages support of the party with
the greatest chance of winning and discourages expressions of
support for minority parties. 241 These arguments undercut the
position that patronage fosters the democratic process, but more
important to the Court's decision was its view that the resultant
impairment of first amendment rights required that the interests
asserted by the government withstand exacting scrutiny:
In summary, patronage dismissals severely restrict political
belief and association. Though there is a vital need for
government efficiency and effectiveness, such dismissals are on
balance not the least restrictive means for fostering that end.
There is also a need to insure that policies which the electorate
237. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
238. Id. at 379 (Powell, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 384.
240. Id. at 388.
241. Id. at 360-69.
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has sanctioned are effectively implemented. That interest can be
fully satisfied by limiting patronage dismissals to policymaking
positions. Finally, patronage dismissals cannot be justified by
their contribution to the proper functioning of our democratic
process through their assistance to partisan politics since
political parties are nurtured by other, less intrusive and equally
effective methods. More fundamentally however, any contribu-
tion of patronage dismissals to the democratic process does not
suffice to override their severe encroachment on First Amend-
ment freedoms. 242
At one extreme, a law barring all who disagree with any policy
of the government from certain positions might have an incremental
effect in weeding out persons who would deliberately frustrate
governmental operations; but that incremental effect would be
insignificant in the face of the law's impact on speech. Patently, the
law would be aimed at speech in disagreement with the government
rather than protecting the efficiency of governmental operations.
Every member of the Court would join in striking it down. At the
other extreme, a law forbidding particular positions to those who
admit they would use them to destroy the government would clearly
protect legitimate governmental interests because its purpose would
be to deal with threatened conduct and not to destroy ideas. It would
be sustained unanimously. In between these extremes lie the
differences in degree that have generated differences among the
justices, differences which reflect varying attitudes towards the
significance of the danger faced and the degree of incremental
protection that the challenged law affords. Some members of the
Court have been more deferential to the legislature than have others,
but the application of the balancing test and the doctrine of
overbreadth in civil cases challenging disability statutes ordinarily
reflects differences in appreciation of the underlying facts rather
than a disagreement over the principles involved.
IV. SPEECH OF SPECIAL GROUPS IMPAIRING
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS
Swift movement is difficult for person with foot in mouth
-Ancient Proverb
The Court has singled out a variety of special groups and held
that their speech may be limited to a greater extent than that of the
general public. These include civil service employees, prisoners and
242. Id. at 372-73.
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military personnel. Each of these groups has a special relationship
with the government, and legislatures, after finding that certain
speech interferes with that relationship, have enacted legislation
ostensibly aimed at assuring that such groups perform their
obligations properly rather than at suppressing their ideas.
A. Civil Service Employees - Protecting the Privileged
by Deprivation
The earliest cases concerning special-group restrictions arose out
of the prohibition of political activities by civil service employees. In
upholding the Hatch Act,243 which applied such restrictions to
federal employees, the Supreme Court in United Public Workers v.
Mitchell244 stated:
[T]his Court must balance the extent of the guarantees of
freedom against a congressional enactment to protect a
democratic society against the supposed evil of political
partisanship by classified employees of government.
Congress recognizes danger to the service in that
political rather than official effort may earn advancement and
to the public in that governmental favor may be channeled
through political connections. 245
Justices Black and Rutledge dissented from the Court's determi-
nation, concluding that the restrictions imposed by the act were
unconstitutional on their face. Justice Douglas dissented on the
ground that, with respect to industrial workers such as the plaintiff
whose case was decided, the absence of direct dealings with the
public eliminated any basis for fear that governmental favor might
be channeled through political connections. He argued that the
concern that government workers might be pressured into political
activity should not suffice to deny them the right to engage in such
activity. The appropriate remedy, according to Justice Douglas,
would have been to proscribe pressure brought by superiors, not to
243. 18 U.S.C. § 61h (Supp. V 1940) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1976)). The
Hatch Act prevented officers and employees in the executive branch of the federal
government, with certain exceptions, from taking "any active part in political
management or in political campaigns."
244. 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Although a number of civil service employees had
challenged the Hatch Act, the Court found that the case was ripe only as to Mr. Poole,
an employee in the United States Mint who, unlike the others, had already engaged in
political activity.
245. Id. at 96-98.
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deprive the workers of their rights.2 46 Although Justice Douglas
refused to pass on the merits of the claims of other federal
employees, Justice Black would have found the Hatch Act unconsti-
tutional as to them also, because he believed that a law proscribing
government officials from granting or denying favors for political
purposes would satisfy the government's legitimate interests without
impairing the political activities undertaken by government em-
ployees in their spare time. He also argued that the statute was both
vague and overbroad.
The arguments of the Mitchell dissenters were reviewed twenty-
six years later in United States Civil Service Commission v.
National Association of Letter Carriers47 as a majority of the Court
again upheld the constitutionality of the Hatch Act in the face of a
first amendment challenge. Writing for the Court, Justice White first
pointed out that the law was neutral as to ideas expressed:
The restrictions so far imposed on federal employees are not
aimed at particular parties, groups, or points of view, but apply
equally to all partisan activities of the type described. .. . Nor
do they seek to control political opinions or beliefs, or to interfere
with or influence anyone's vote at the polls. 2 48
Such legislation is particularly unlikely to be directed at suppressing
ideas because its function is to insulate employees from pressures
from the party in power.249 To the argument that laws that forbid
granting benefits and promotions for political purposes could end
these evils without restricting speech, Justice White replied that "for
many years the joint judgment of the Executive and Congress has
been that to protect the rights of federal employees with respect to
their jobs and their political acts and beliefs it is not enough merely
to forbid one employee to attempt to influence or coerce another."215
246. Id. at 126 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Both Justice Black and Justice
Douglas argued that the claims of all the plaintiffs were ripe for decision. Justice
Douglas, however, refused to consider the issues posed by plaintiffs other than Poole
because the majority opinion did not reach them. Justice Black's dissent applied to all
plaintiffs; Justice Rutledge joined Justice Black's dissent as applied to Poole, but
agreed with the majority that the complaint of the other plaintiffs was not ripe for
adjudication. Id. at 104-26.
247. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
248. Id. at 564.
249. Although the executive branch of the federal government is often controlled
by a party other than the majority party in Congress, the Congress has sufficient
power in appropriations and confirmations to assure that executive officers do not
force employees to work politically against the dominant power in Congress. Further,
the law has been maintained during the many years when the same party controlled
the presidency and both the House and the Senate.
250. Id. at 566 (footnote omitted).
1979]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
In a dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice
Douglas appeared to argue for unregulated individual political
activity: "In the areas of speech, like religion, it is of no concern
what the employee says in private to his wife or to the public in
Constitution Hall."'25 1 Although the dissenters made clear their view
that so long as an employee's outside activities do not impair his
performance on the job the government may not impose regulations
upon these activities, the bulk of the dissenting opinion focused on
the vagueness of the law, as typified by operative language such as
"an active part ... in political campaigns." Justice Douglas'
opinion argued that the Civil Service Commission had too much
discretion in ruling upon prohibited activities and hence chilled
innocent speech, 252 and made similar arguments with respect to a
law regulating the political activity of state employees in his
dissenting opinion in a companion case, Broadrick v. Oklahoma.253
The majority, however, upheld the state law challenged in Broadrick
as pursuing a legitimate governmental interest and stated that when
the state sanction applies to conduct as opposed to pure speech, the
doctrine of facial overbreadth should be applied sparingly. 254 Justice
251. Id. at 597 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas elaborated the point by
stating that
no one could object if employees were barred from using office time to engage
in outside activities whether political or otherwise. But it is no concern of
Government what an employee does in his spare time, whether religion,
recreation, social work, or politics is his hobby - unless what he does impairs
efficiency or other facets of the merits of his job. Some things, some activities
do affect or may be thought to affect the employee's job performance. But his
political creed, like his religion, is irrelevant.
Id.
252. Id. at 596.
There is no definition of what "an active part ... in political campaigns"
means.
The Commission, on a case-by-case approach, has listed 13 categories of
prohibited activities, 5 C.F.R. § 733.122(b), starting with the catch-all "include
but are not limited to." So the Commission ends up with open-end discretion
to penalize X or not to penalize him.
Id. at 595-99.
253. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
254. Id. at 613-15.
[T]he plain import of our cases, is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth
adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its
function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected
behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from "pure speech"
toward conduct and that conduct - even if expressive - falls within the
scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in
maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unpro-
tected conduct.
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Douglas' Broadrick dissent argued that such laws cannot be valid -
"[t]hose who work for government have no watered-down constitu-
tional rights. So far as the First Amendment goes, I would keep them
on the same plane as all other people"2 55 - but he was alone in
focusing exclusively on the speaker's right to speak. The remaining
dissenters, Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall, avoided
pronouncing on the constitutionality of statutes that regulate
political activity generally 256 and focused on the asserted defects of
vagueness and overbreadth in the statute at issue. 257 Thus, a clear
majority of the Court was apparently willing to accept the
legitimacy of a reasonably tailored statute banning political activity
in the civil service absent a finding of intent to suppress the ideas
which would be expressed.
B. Military Personnel - "Theirs not to reason why"
Civil service employees are not the only group to have special
restrictions on their speech rights. In Parker v. Levy 25 1 the Court
emphasized that the distinctive factors of military society mandated
a less stringent application of first amendment protections in
holding that a soldier could be convicted under the Code of Military
Justice for urging Black enlisted men not to go to Vietnam.259
255. Id. at 621 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
256. Whatever one's view of the desirability or constitutionality of legislative
efforts to restrict the political activities of government employees, one must
regard today's decision upholding § 818 of the Oklahoma Merit System of
Personnel Administration Act as a wholly unjustified retreat from fundamen-
tal and previously well-established First and Fourteenth Amendment princi-
ples.
Id. at 621-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
257. The dissenters noted that "the critical phrase of the Oklahoma Act - no
employee shall 'take part in the management or affairs of any political party or in
any political campaign' - is left almost wholly undefined." Id. at 624 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Further, the dissenters argued that the rules of the State Personnel Board
promulgated under the act were overbroad. One rule stated that "[a]n employee in the
classified service may not wear a political badge, button, or similar partisan emblem,
nor may such employee display a partisan political sticker or sign on an automobile
operated by him or under his control." Id. at 626-27. As the dissent pointed out, even
the Court conceded that a ban on the wearing of buttons or the display of bumper
stickers might be impermissible. Id. at 627. The majority, nevertheless, concluded that
the statute, even if susceptible to some improper applications, was not substantially
overbroad.
258. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
259. Id. at 758. The Court explained:
While the members of the military are not excluded from the protection
granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military
community and of the military mission requires a different application of
those protections. The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the
consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible
19791
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Quoting from an opinion of the United States Court of Military
Appeals, the Levy Court explained that:
"[t]he armed forces depend on a command structure that at
times must commit men to combat, not only hazarding their
lives but ultimately involving the security of the Nation itself.
Speech that is protected in the civil population may nonetheless
undermine the effectiveness of response to command. If it does,
it is constitutionally unprotected. ' '260
The status of a soldier has two aspects. As a part of the military,
a soldier must react to commands with obedience rather than
inquiry in order properly to perform his function. At the same time,
because the soldier is a citizen whose vote counts equally with all
others in impacting the decisionmaking process, he must be free to
question and criticize the military policies of his country. The
majority viewed obedience and discipline as the heart of the
military, however, and perceived the articles under which Levy was
convicted 261 as directed at achieving military competence rather
within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible
outside it.
Id. The Court provided no new test but stated that the proper standard for reviewing
the articles of the Military Code for vagueness is the standard that applies to criminal
statutes regulating economic affairs, id. at 756, and emphasized that speech interests
should be accorded "less weight" in the military context. In that context, the Court
feared that the consequence of hampering military efficiency could be the destruction
of society.
260. Id. at 759 (quoting United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564, 570, 45 C.M.R. 338,
344 (1972)).
261. Uniform Code of Military Justice, arts. 90(2), 133-34, 10 U.S.C. §§ 890, 933- 934
(1970) (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 890, 933-934 (1976)). Article 133 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice provided: "Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman
who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished
as a court-martial may direct." Article 134 provided:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects
to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of
a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not
capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken
cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to
the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of
that court.
Appellant Army Captain Howard Levy, an opponent of the war in Vietnam,
was charged with violating these articles by, among other things, stating that Black
soldiers "should refuse to go to Viet Nam and if sent should refuse to fight." The
majority explained:
Since appellee could have had no reasonable doubt that his public statements
urging Negro enlisted men not to go to Vietnam if ordered to do so were both
"unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," and "to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces," in violation of the provisions of Arts. 133
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than at suppressing speech or ideas. The limitation on the
appellant's speech was thus upheld as a promotion of discipline not
intended to suppress ideas.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, would not have made a special case
for the military: "On its face there are no exceptions - no preferred
classes for whose benefit the First Amendment extends, no exempt
classes. ' 262 He argued that "[u]ttering one's beliefs is sacrosanct
under the First Amendment. Punishing the utterances is an
'abridgment' of speech in the constitutional sense. ' 263 Moreover,
Justice Douglas was not awed by the necessities of military
discipline. In his view, obedience to orders and rules forbidding
subordinates to countermand them were proper, but restrictions on
ideas about those orders were not. The other dissenters 264 in Levy
were able to avoid committing themselves on the issue of the status
of the military for first amendment purposes because they would
have invalidated the court-martial on the ground that the articles 265
were too vague. 266
C. Prisoners - Stirring up Stir
Prisoners are perhaps the foremost special group whose speech
rights have been considered recently. As the thirteenth amendment
recognizes, 26 7 convicted criminals lose many freedoms guaranteed
other citizens. Although their liberty has been taken away by due
process of law, and they have no right to vote, 268 society cannot so
and 134, respectively, his challenge to them as unconstitutionally vague under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment must fail.
417 U.S. at 757.
262. 417 U.S. at 768 (Douglas, J., dissenting). It should be noted that Professor
Emerson, the most noted absolutist scholar, would leave the military out of his system
of freedom of expression and apply different rules. T. EMERSON, supra note 4. at 57.
263. 417 U.S. at 772 (footnote omitted).
264. Justice Stewart wrote a dissent in which Justices Douglas and Brennan
joined. Justice Marshall did not participate in the case.
265. See note 261 supra.
266. It may be that military necessity justifies the promulgation of substantive
rules of law that are wholly foreign to civilian life, but I fail to perceive how
any legitimate military goal is served by enshrouding these rules in language
so vague and uncertain as to be incomprehensible to the servicemen who are
to be governed by them.
Id. at 788 Stewart, Brennan & Douglas, JJ., dissenting (footnote omitted). See also
Ancillary Doctrines, supra note 9, at 711-12, 721 n.197.
267. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis
supplied).
268. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
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easily or so confidently rid itself of their voices and ideas. As the
Court pointed out in Procunier v. Martinez,269 a case involving the
power of prison officials to censor mail that "unduly complained" or
expressed "inflammatory views," "[w]hatever the status of a
prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is
plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech. '2 70 The Court also focused on the
interest of outsiders in receiving information, and, rather than
summarily accepting the proffered interest in maintaining prison
discipline, turned for guidance to cases, such as O'Brien,271 that had
balanced incidental restrictions on first amendment rights against
legitimate governmental interests:
First, the regulation or practice in question must further an
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression .... Second, the limitation of First
Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or
essential to the protection of the particular governmental
interest involved.272
Thus, the diminshed legal status of prisoners was not viewed as
determinative, and because the Martinez Court found no reason
other than suppression of ideas for the broad censorship authorized
by the California rules, it struck them down. Justices Douglas,
Brennan and Marshall concurred, arguing that the rights of the
prisoners and their correspondents were infringed. 273
The recognition of first amendment rights in communications of
prisoners with others is not unlimited. In Pell v. Procunier274 and
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.275 (which was summarily decided on
the authority of Pell), the Court held that prison rules forbidding
press interviews with particular inmates designated by newsmen
269. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
270. Id. at 408.
271. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See text accompanying notes 70 to 79 supra.
272. 416 U.S. at 413 (paraphrasing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
273. Justice Marshall's concurrence, joined in by Justice Brennan and in part by
Justice Douglas, was particularly eloquent.
When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does not lose his human
quality; his mind does not become closed to ideas; his intellect does not cease
to feed on a free and open interchange of opinions; his yearning for self-
respect does not end; nor is his quest for self-realization concluded. . . . It is
the role of the First Amendment and this Court to protect those precious
personal rights by which we satisfy such basic yearnings of the human spirit.
Id. at 428 (Marshall, J., concurring).
274. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
275. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
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were constitutional as to state and federal prisons respectively. The
regulations in Pell were challenged by prisoners and newsmen; in
Saxbe, the regulations were challenged by the press alone. In Pell,
the regulations had been enacted in response to prison riots which
prison officials had attributed in part to the leadership power that
certain inmates derived from being the focus of press attention.
Given this justification and the fact that alternative means of
communication were available to prisoners,276 the Pell Court had
little difficulty in finding that the rules were directed to the
legitimate governmental interest of security in prisons: "So long as
this restriction operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the
content of the expression, it falls within the 'appropriate rules and
regulations' to which 'prisoners are necessarily subject,' . . . and
does not abridge any First Amendment freedoms retained by prison
inmates." 277 Because the rule at issue was merely a particularized
version of a general rule limiting visitation rights to relatives of
prisoners, the Pell majority found it unnecessary to balance the
government's interest in prison security against the requirements of
the first amendment. With respect to the rights of reporters to
interview prisoners, in neither case was the press placed in a less
advantageous position than the general public and, the Court held,
the press was not entitled under the first amendment to be placed in
a more advantageous position. Newsmen do not have first amend-
ment rights superior to those of the public in general.278
276. For example, the rule permitted prisoners to visit with their relatives, clergy,
attorneys, and old friends. 417 U.S. at 824-25 n.4. See also 417 U.S. at 849 (dictum).
Prisoners may also communicate through the mails, see Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396 (1974).
277. 417 U.S. at 828 (footnote omitted).
This past term, in Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979), the Supreme Court
again upheld prison rules affecting expression. The federally operated Metropolitan
Correctional Center in New York City, designed primarily for pretrial detainees,
prohibited inmates from receiving hardback books not mailed directly from
publishers, book clubs or bookstores. The rule was justified by a concern that such
materials would be used to smuggle contraband into the prison. The majority noted
that the rule was content neutral, that alternative means of obtaining reading
material were available and that the impact of the rule on pretrial detainees was
limited to sixty days. In this context, the Court held that the "considered judgment" of
prison officials concerned with security "must control in the absence of prohibitions
far more sweeping than these." Id. at 1880. The primary thrust of the dissent of
Justices Stevens and Brennan was an argument that the center conditions were
punishment and thus a violation of the due process rights of pretrial detainees, but
Justice Marshall's dissent emphasized that any limitation on expression must be
justified by "compelling necessity" and that the government failed to meet this
burden. Id. at 1892 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
278. See, e.g., 417 U.S. at 834; 417 U.S. at 849.
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The Pell dissenters, Justices Powell, Douglas, Brennan and
Marshall, found the regulations overbroad in their "total ban on all
media interviews with any individually designated inmate on any
matter whatsoever. ' 279 Justice Powell argued in his Saxbe dissent
that the security problems posed by media-created "big wheels"
could be resolved by narrower regulations that would have a much
less drastic impact on press access to prisoners.280 Justice Stewart
for the majority acknowledged that some interviews with model
prisoners posed no danger to security, but was clearly impressed by
the "expert judgment" of the United States Attorney General that
"such a selective policy would spawn serious discipline and morale
problems of its own by engendering hostility and resentment among
inmates who were refused interview privileges granted to their
fellows." 28'
Deference to the decisions of prison officials reached a high-
water mark in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union
Inc.,282 when the Court upheld prison rules prohibiting inmates from
soliciting other inmates to join the North Carolina Prisoners Labor
Union, barred all meetings of the union within the prison, and
refused to deliver packets of union publications that had been mailed
in bulk to several inmates for redistribution among other prisoners.
The district court had granted injunctive relief allowing inmate-to-
inmate solicitation to the union on the grounds that neither experts
in the field nor the court upon its own evaluation had reached a
consensus that such an association of inmates would necessarily
disrupt the operation of the penal institution. 2 3 Justice Rehnquist,
writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, stated: "Appellant
prison officials concluded that the presence, perhaps even the
objectives, of a prisoners' labor union would be detrimental to order
and security in the prisons .... It is enough to say that they have
not been conclusively shown to be wrong in this view." 28 4 Confident
279. 417 U.S. at 839 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Powell concurred in Pell
insofar as the Court held that prisoners do not have the right to speak to particular
newsmen, but dissented in both Pell and Saxbe as to the denial of access to newsmen.
417 U.S. at 835-36 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 417 U.S. at
850-75 (Powell, J., dissenting).
280. 417 U.S. at 873.
281. Id. at 849. Justice Stewart emphasized that the regulations were not part of an
attempt to conceal prison conditions. This conclusion was derived from the history of
the enactment of the regulations, the permission of correspondence and media visits
to prison.
282. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
283. North Carolina Prisoner's Labor Union, Inc. v. Jones, 409 F. Supp. 937,
942-45 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
284. 433 U.S. at 132.
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that the regulation of intra-inmate communication served legitimate
penal purposes, the Court indicated no need to apply overbreadth
analysis. After noting that "an inmate does not retain those First
Amendment rights that are 'inconsistent with his status as a
prisoner..,' ,"285 the opinion concluded that balancing favored the
interests of the institution.2 6
Justices Marshall and Brennan challenged the Court's stan-
dards as constituting a wholesale abandonment of traditional
principles of first amendment analysis. They argued in dissent that
the majority's willingness to defer to prison officials solely on the
basis of the rationality of their decisions was mistaken and that the
courts should assume greater responsibility when reviewing regula-
tions that limit prisoners' speech.28 7
Perhaps the most interesting and yet inconclusive case in the
prison context was decided last year. In Houchins v. KQED,2s8
the Court by a four-three margin reversed a district court order
granting media representatives access to the Santa Rita jail. Prior to
the commencement of the suit, persons who knew an inmate could
visit him, but there was no general press access to interview
prisoners. After suit was filed alleging that this policy prevented the
effective dissemination of information about prison conditions to the
public, a policy of monthly tours was instituted. The tours did not
include the disciplinary areas, cameras and tape recorders were not
allowed, and those on the tour could not interview inmates. The jail
officials claimed that the policy was necessary to protect inmate
privacy and to minimize security and administrative problems. The
district court had found that "a more flexible press policy at Santa
Rita [was] both desirable and attainable." 2 9
285. Id. at 129 (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 822).
286. See id. at 129-33.
287. See id. at 139-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
288. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
289. Id. at 7.
"As to the inmates' privacy, the media representatives commonly obtain
written consent from those inmates who are interviewed and/or photo-
graphed, and coverage of inmates is never provided without their full
agreement. As to pre-trial detainees who could be harmed by pre-trial
publicity, consent can be obtained not only from such inmates but also from
their counsel. Jail "celebrities" are not likely to emerge as a result of a random
interview policy. Regarding jail security, any cameras and equipment brought
into the jail can be searched. . . . [T]here was substantial testimony to the
effect that ground rules laid down by jail administrators, such as a ban on
photographs of security devices, are consistently respected by the media."




In reversing the district court, Chief Justice Burger's opinion
announcing the judgment of the Court did not rely on the need for
deference to administrative judgment in the operation of the jails; it
was based squarely on the principle that the press has no greater
right to access to prisons than does the public in general. 29°
Moreover, the Chief Justice argued that the Constitution does not
compel the government to provide information on demand: "There
is no discernible basis for a constitutional duty to disclose, or for
standards governing disclosure of or access to information. ' 291 He
did note, however, that the petitioners had other available means to
discover jail conditions, including letters from inmates and inter-
views with inmates' counsel, former inmates, visitors and prison
personnel.
Justice Stewart's concurrence agreed that the first amendment
did not grant a right of access, but argued that when access is
permitted it must be equal access - equal in a flexible sense that
accommodates the practical distinctions between the press and the
general public. Justice Stewart then argued that access was effective
for the self-informing purposes of the general public even if cameras
and recording equipment were barred, but that the restrictive rule
denied effective access to the media. He concurred with the reversal
of the district court order, however, on -the ground that the order
gave the press access to areas and sources of information from
which the public on tours had been excluded. 292
Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan and
Powell, disputed the majority's denial of the existence of a
constitutional right of access:
The preservation of a full and free flow of information to the
general public has long been recognized as a core objective of the
First Amendment to the Constitution. . . .
In addition to safeguarding the right of one individual to
receive what another elects to communicate, the First Amend-
ment serves an essential societal function. Our system of self-
government assumes the existence of an informed citizenry. ...
Without some protection for the acquisition of information about
the operation of public institutions such as prisons by the public
at large, the process of self-governance contemplated by the
Framers would be stripped of its substance.293
290. See note 278 and accompanying text supra.
291. 438 U.S. at 14.
292. Id. at 16-19 (Stewart, J., concurring).
293. Id. at 30-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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At times the government fails to provide access to information
because it would be too costly to do so;294 other times, the refusal is
premised on the need for secrecy to conduct sensitive operations such
as negotiations or military actions. 295 Denial of access for the
purpose of suppressing discussion of prison conditions, however,
does not appear to be a legitimate governmental end, and this is
what the dissenters saw in prison policy at Santa Rita: "While
prison officials have an interest in the time and manner of public
acquisition of information about the institutions they administer,
there is no legitimate penological justification for concealing from
citizens the conditions in which their fellow citizens are being
confined." 296
Because Justices Marshall and Blackmun did not participate in
the Houchins decision, there is still no pronouncement by a majority
of the Court on a right to access. Thus, the Court may eventually
find that rules such as those at issue in Houchins mask government
cover-ups and abridge speech. Indeed, with respect to the amount of
deference to be accorded prison regulations, Justices Brennan and
Marshall have consistently urged that the right of the citizen to
speak cannot be abridged in any context unless the government
shows a compelling need unrelated to the suppression of speech. A
majority of the Court, however, has consistently held that stringent
requirement too burdensome on the attainment of legitimate
governmental aims.
V. REQUIRING NONINCRIMINATING DISCLOSURE
To AID GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS
Silence must indeed be golden, because the state is so anxious to
make people give it up.
In a variety of.instances, an agency of the government may seek
to compel an individual to reveal his beliefs, private statements and
associations. The government may want information for the purpose
of drafting legislation, monitoring the administration of existing
294. The federal government has made much information available under the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552 (1976), but it has not been without cost.
See generally Sykes, Of Men And Laws: Murphy, Cornford, Arnold, Potter,
Parkinson, Peter, Maccoby, And Gall, 38 MD. L. REv. 37, 54 (1978).
295. Even the dissenters acknowledged the need for secrecy in grand jury
proceedings, in the conferences of the Court and in executive sessions of other official
bodies. Id. at 34-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976) has many exceptions in areas where Congress has deemed
secrecy important. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978); EPA
v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
296. 438 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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laws, or prosecuting criminal acts. Forced disclosure of discussions
or associations intended to be private, however, may have an
inhibiting effect on free expression. In 1958 Chief Justice Warren
listed the ways in which compelling a witness to testify about his
beliefs might deter free speech:
The mere summoning of a witness and compelling him to testify,
against his will, about his beliefs, expressions or associations is
a measure of governmental interference. And when those forced
revelations concern matters that are unorthodox, unpopular, or
even hateful to the general public, the reaction in the life of the
witness may be disastrous. This effect is even more harsh when
it is past beliefs, expressions or associations that are disclosed
and judged by current standards rather than those contempor-
ary with the matters exposed. Nor does the witness alone suffer
the consequences. Those who are identified by witnesses and
thereby placed in the same glare of publicity are equally subject
to public stigma, scorn and obloquy. Beyond that, there is the
more subtle and immeasurable effect upon those who tend to
adhere to the most orthodox and uncontroversial views and
associations in order to avoid a similar fate at some future
time.297
Despite this effect on freedom of speech, the Court has permitted
some legislative investigation into beliefs, associations, and expres-
sion, as such investigation is inherent in the legislative process.
Such inquiries must, however, be related to, and in furtherance of, a
legitimate legislative task; they may not be used for the personal
aggrandizement of the investigator or to punish those being
investigated. "The critical element is the existence of, and the weight
to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding
disclosures from an unwilling witness." 298 In other words, the Court
will apply a "balancing test" in evaluating forced disclosures by
legislatures.
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 299 Justice Frankfurter, in a
concurring opinion joined by Justice Harlan, applied the balancing
test to protect an unwilling witness who had refused t6 answer
questions of the New Hampshire Attorney General pertaining to
lectures he had given and to his associations with the Progressive
Party. Justice Frankfurter argued that:
the inviolability of privacy belonging to a citizen's political
loyalties has so overwhelming an importance to the well-being of
297. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197-98 (1957).
298. Id. at 198.
299. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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our kind of society that it cannot be constitutionally encroached
upon the basis of so meagre a countervailing interest of the State
as may be argumentatively found in the remote, shadowy threat
to the security of New Hampshire allegedly presented in the
origins and contributing elements of the Progressive Party and
in petitioner's relations to these.3°°
A majority of the Court, however, avoided direct balancing by
applying ancillary doctrines. After noting that the New Hampshire
Attorney General had been directed to " 'make full and complete
investigation with respect to violations of the subversive activities
act of 1951 and to determine whether subversive persons as defined
in said act are presently located within this state,' "301 the Sweezy
Court ruled that the vagueness of this authorization made it unclear
whether the questions involved were pertinent to the object of the
legislature's interest: "The lack of any indications that the
legislature wanted the information the Attorney General attempted
to elicit from petitioner must be treated as the absence of
authority." 3 2 Accordingly, the Court reversed Sweezy's contempt
conviction on the ground that he was denied due process of law.
On the same day that it decided Sweezy, the Supreme Court
rendered a similar decision in Watkins v. United States.3°3 Watkins
had refused to answer questions about acquaintances who had
engaged in Communist Party activity in the past but who no longer
did so. The Court reversed his contempt conviction on the ground
that he was not told how these questions were pertinent to the
subject under inquiry by a subcommittee of the House Committee on
Un-American Activities: "Petitioner was thus not accorded a fair
opportunity to determine whether he was within his rights in
refusing to answer, and his conviction is necessarily invalid under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 3°4
When the pertinency of the question to the subject of legislative
inquiry was clear, however, the Court has demanded that the
witness respond. In Barenblatt v. United States, 305 the witness
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities had refused
to answer questions concerning his membership in the Communist
Party and his knowledge that another named individual was a party
300. Id. at 265 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
301. Id. at 236-37 (citing to Joint Resolution Relating to the Investigation of
Subversive Activities, 1953 N.H. LAWS, ch. 307).
302. Id. at 254.
303. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
304. Id. at 215.
305. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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member. The subject matter of the investigation had been identified
as communist infiltration of education, and particularly the
activities of the named person - who had identified Barenblatt as a
party member - concerning whom Barenblatt refused to testify.
Barenblatt claimed that the inquiry was not pertinent to the
legislative purpose because it was not aimed at revolutionary action
but rather at the theoretical classroom discussion of communism.
The Court rejected this argument as representing too narrow a view
of the legislature's legitimate investigatory process. Given the
Court's finding of a legitimate purpose underlying the investigation
- self-preservation - Justice Harlan concluded that the appropriate
test for compelling disclosure was "a balancing by the courts of the
competing private and public interests at stake in the particular
circumstances shown .. ,,"306 and that the balance had to be struck
in favor of the latter.30 7 In passing, he disclaimed any power in the
Court to examine the motive of the legislature: "So long as Congress
acts in pursuance of its constitutional power, the Judiciary lacks
authority to intervene on the basis of the motives which spurred the
exercise of that power. ' 30 8 Nevertheless, his statement that "[h]aving
scrutinized this record we cannot say that the unanimous panel of
the Court of Appeals which first considered this case was wrong in
concluding that 'the primary purposes of the inquiry were in aid of
legislative processes' "309 suggests concern for just such a motive. As
in O'Brien,310 direct inquiry into legislative motivation was spurned
as too subjective for the Court to handle; the Court could only require
that the law or investigation be precisely defined to serve a
306. Id. at 126.
307. Id. at 134.
308. Id. at 132. Justice Harlan cited Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 455 (1931),
and cases cited therein for this proposition. One case cited in the Arizona decision was
McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904), in which the Court had stated that
no instance is afforded from the foundation of the government where an act
which was within a power conferred, was declared to be repugnant to the
Constitution, because it appeared to the judicial mind that the particular
exertion of constitutional power was either unwise or unjust. To announce
such a principle would amount to declaring that, in our constitutional system,
the judiciary was not only charged with the duty of upholding the
Constitution, but also with the responsibility of correcting every possible
abuse arising from the exercise by the other departments of their conceded
authority. So to hold would be to overthrow the entire distinction between the
legislative, judicial, and executive departments of the government, upon
which our system is founded, and would be a mere act of judicial usurpation.
Id. at 54.
309. 360 U.S. at 133.
310. O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367 (1967). See Freedom of Speech, supra
note 6, at 559-63.
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governmental interest other than the suppression of ideas and
protect against frivolous assertions of governmental interest by
balancing the interest against the interest in free speech.
Justice Black, dissenting in an opinion joined by Justices
Warren and Douglas, began by asserting that the questions directly
impinged upon associational rights and abridged freedom of speech
and that such questions should never be subject to legislative or
judicial balancing.311 Even if some form of balancing might be
appropriate, he continued, the wrong interests were balanced by the
majority, for Barenblatt's interest in refraining from revealing his
communist affiliations was not private but rather "the interest of the
people as a whole in being able to join organizations, advocate
causes and make political 'mistakes' without later being subjected to
governmental penalties for having dared to think for themselves. ' 312
Similarly, Justice Black argued that the governmental interest in
learning about Barenblatt's associations in order to formulate laws
affecting the educational process was to be distinguished from a
truly substantial interest in self-preservation. The nation would not
fall because Congress was not able to determine whether Barenblatt
was a communist. The majority were apparently more willing to
focus on the governmental interest. Barenblatt demonstrates that
once the government interest is balanced and found significant, it
will be presumed genuine, and the Court will uphold the questions
without delving into their actual impact on persons under investiga-
tion.
Simultaneously with Barenblatt, the Court decided Uphaus v.
Wyman. 313 There, as in Sweezy, the Court was faced with an
investigation by the New Hampshire Attorney General, who had
requested Uphaus to produce a list of names of persons who attended
the summer camp of World Fellowship, Inc., of which he was
executive director. This time the New Hampshire Supreme Couri
held as a matter of state law that the inquiry was authorized and
desired by the legislature in order to determine whether there were
any subversive persons within the state. Uphaus had "participated
in 'Communist Front' activities" and many of the speakers invited to
311. Justice Black's denigration of the balancing test in Barenblatt is consistent
with his position that the first amendment is an absolute prohibition, so that no
restriction on the content of speech is permissible. See Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960). See also Cahn, Mr. Justice Black and First Amendment
"Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549 (1962). But even Justice Black
would have balanced interests in litigation involving regulation of the time, place and
manner of speech. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
312. 360 U.S. at 144 (Black, J., dissenting).
313. 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
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the camp had either been members of the Communist Party or had
connections or affiliations with it or one of the organizations cited as
subversive by the United States Attorney General. That these facts
revealed no criminal activity was not viewed as significant by the
Court, for in legislative investigations, as distinguished from
criminal prosecutions, the investigative powers of the state are not
circumscribed by the need to present sufficient evidence of subver-
sion. Rather, the facts before the Court in Uphaus evinced a
sufficient nexus between the organization and subversive activities
to justify legislative inquiry. Consequently, the governmental
interest in self-preservation was found sufficiently compelling to
override the associational rights of those affected by the legislative
inquiry.
Justices Black and Douglas, of course, dissented directly on first
amendment grounds - the inquiry was viewed as abridging freedom
of speech and association, and thus no possible state interest could
justify it. They also joined Justice Brennan, dissenting with Chief
Justice Warren, in rejecting the Court's decision on the ground that
the only purpose of the investigation revealed by the record was to
expose these persons to obloquy, not to engage in legislation.314
Because they concluded that the only purpose demonstrated was the
abridgment of first amendment rights, the dissenters believed that
the questions were improper. The basis for the former conclusion
was that the exposure of named persons was the only substantive
result of the attorney general's investigations. The majority, on the
other hand, viewed this exposure merely as an inescapable incident
of a legitimate investigation of the presence of subversives in the
state.
In 1963 the Court demonstrated that in some instances it would
be more circumspect in its analysis of legislative inquiries by
requiring a substantial relationship between the information sought
and a compelling state interest, thus expanding the modicum of
protection accorded reluctant witnesses. The chairman of the Florida
Legislative Committee had stated that his committee was investigat-
ing communist activities, including the infiltration of communists
into organizations active in the fields of race relations and the
reform of social practices by litigation and administrative pressure.
Pursuant to this inquiry, he requested the president of the Miami
branch of the NAACP to bring his membership lists to a hearing
and to use them as a basis for his testimony.315 In Gibson v. Florida
314. Id. at 82 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
315. The refusal of the witness Gibson to bring his organization's membership lists
to the hearing was "based on the ground that to bring the lists to the hearing and to
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Legislative Investigation Committee,316 the Court ruled that the
record was insufficient to show the substantial connection between
the Miami branch of the NAACP and the Communist Party which,
as the Florida committee had conceded, was prerequisite to
demonstrating the immediate substantial state interest necessary to
sustain the inquiry. There was no suggestion that the NAACP itself
was a subversive organization and no substantial evidence of
communist infiltration of the association. Because the discovery of
communist membership in the NAACP could not have been the
object of the legislative investigation, the Court found that the
NAACP was itself the focus of the inquiry, and held that this
purpose could not justify the inquiry.31 7
The dissenters, Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart and White,
pointed out that the questions had focused on twelve named
individuals who allegedly had some connection with the NAACP so
that the secrecy of their membership was already compromised.
They argued that the questions pertained merely to the accuracy of
the existing allegations that communists had infiltrated certain
activities and that limiting such a narrow inquiry would effectively
prevent investigation until the committee knew the answers to the
questions at issue.31 8
Gibson was the basis for the Court's opinion when New
Hampshire's law mandating an investigation of subversive activi-
ties31 9 produced another confrontation. This time the witness,
DeGregory, informed the New Hampshire Attorney General that he
was not a communist, knew of no communist activities (or even of
the existence of the Communist Party within the state) during the
preceding six and one-half years and refused to answer questions
about his activities and associations prior to that time. In DeGregory
v. Attorney General,3 20 the Court stated that "[t]he present record is
utilize them as the basis of his testimony would interfere with the free exercise of
Fourteenth Amendment associational rights of members and prospective members of
the N.A.A.C.P." Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 543 (1963). He
was willing, however, to answer questions on communist infiltration of the
organization based on his own personal knowledge. Id.
316. 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
317. Id. at 547-49. The Court distinguished Barenblatt on the grounds that it was
founded on a holding that "the Communist Party is not an ordinary or legitimate
political party, as known in this country, and that, because of its particular nature,
membership therein is itself a permissible subject of regulation and legislative
scrutiny." Id. at 547 (emphasis in original). No such predicate of potential subversion
was shown for the NAACP.
318. See id. at 585 (White, J., dissenting).
319. See text accompanying note 301 supra.
320. 383 U.S. 825 (1966).
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devoid of any evidence that there is any Communist movement in
New Hampshire, ' 321 or any danger of sedition against the state itself
and found no power to probe the past when no present need was
shown: "New Hampshire's interest on this record is too remote and
conjectural to override the guarantee of the First Amendment that a
person can speak or not, as he chooses, free of all governmental
compulsion. ' 32 2 Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Stewart and
White, again dissented. He argued that "New Hampshire ... should
be free to investigate the existence or nonexistence of Communist
Party subversion, or any other legitimate subject of concern to the
State, without first being asked to produce evidence of the very type
to be sought in the course of the inquiry. ' 323
The net result of these cases is to require the legislature to define
clearly the information sought and to demonstrate its relevance to a
proper legislative purpose. Apparently, the legislature must then
establish some basis for believing that the information relates to a
serious existing problem rather than a hypothetical possibility. The
degree to which the Court should force the investigating committee
to demonstrate the existence of the problem has generated sharp
disagreement among the justices. The complaint of the dissenters in
DeGregory and Gibson seems sensible - it is unfair to require proof
that what one is searching for exists before allowing the search to
proceed. Thus, so long as the object of the inquiry is to determine the
existence of a danger with which the legislature could deal, these
members of the Court would have permitted the inquiry. The
appointments of Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and
Stevens raised the possibility that at least three of the new judges
might combine with Justices White and Stewart to form a new
majority on this issue. DeGregory, however, remains the last
statement by the full Court, and it found a majority sensitive to the
great potential for using the investigatory power to stifle powerless
dissent. Because an investigatory committee can receive voluntary
information from any witness, including government infiltrators
into subversive groups, it would appear highly unlikely that a
serious threat to national security will exist without some knowledge
of it coming to the attention of the committee. Thus, requiring a
showing of a basis for believing that the danger under investigation
321. Id. at 829.
322. Id. at 830. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, stated that "the staleness of
both the basis for the investigation and its subject matter makes indefensible such
exposure of one's associational and political past - exposure which is objectionable
and damaging in the extreme to one whose associations and political views do not
command majority approval." Id. at 829-30 (footnote omitted).
323. Id. at 830 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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exists does not seem onerous or suicidal, and it can provide
important protection to the speech and association rights of
dissidents.
More recently, the forced disclosure problem was presented to
the Supreme Court in a different context. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 324
the matter to be disclosed was not speech or association, but acts
observed by, or reported to, the witness, who was a reporter.
Branzburg sought to avoid disclosing the identity of persons he had
observed possessing, making or using illicit drugs, primarily
hashish and marijuana. In a companion case the appellant, also a
journalist, sought to avoid appearing before a grand jury to answer
questions concerning what he had observed in the headquarters of
the Black Panther organization. Because the witnesses were
newsmen whose ability to inform the public arguably depended on
the ability to keep sources confidential, the first amendment was
invoked as a defense to forced disclosure. Disclosure of the identities
of informants could deter the giving of such information to newsmen
and thus diminish one of the core functions of the press - the
dissemination of news. Although the Branzburg majority acknowl-
edged that "without some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press could be eviscerated," 325 they concluded that the
evidence before them failed to demonstrate that disclosure would
result in a significant constriction of the flow of news. Returning to
the notion that the government may incidentally impair speech if it
does so in pursuance of a legitimate nonspeech purpose - "[i]t is
clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental
burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil
or criminal statutes of general applicability" 326 - the Court resorted
to the balancing test in ruling that the testimony of reporters may be
compelled:
On the records now before us, we perceive no basis for holding
that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring
effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the
consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is
said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens,
respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid
grand jury investigation or criminal trial. 327
324. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
325. Id. at 681.
326. Id. at 682.
327. Id. at 690-91.
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The Court held that the guidelines of Gibson, the establishment of a
nexus between the information desired and the legitimate function of
the government,328 had been met: "The grand jury called these
reporters as they would others - because it was likely that they
could supply information to help the Government determine whether
illegal conduct had occurred and, if it had, whether there was
sufficient evidence to return an indictment." 329
Justice Powell concurred, emphasizing that the Court might not
require disclosure when the information bore "only a remote and
tenuous relationship to the subject of investigation" or if there were
no "legitimate need of law enforcement. ' ' 330 Justice Stewart, joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented. They would have
permitted compulsory disclosure only when the government is able
to demonstrate that the information sought is "clearly relevant to a
precisely defined subject of governmental inquiry." 331 The dissenters
would have required that the government:
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the
newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a specific
probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the information
sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive
of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling
and overriding interest in the information. 332
As in Gibson,333 the differences between the two major groups on the
Court revolved around the degree of necessity that must be shown
before the information must be revealed. In Branzburg, the Court
found too onerous the requirement of a demonstration that the
328. See text accompanying notes 316 & 317 supra.
329. 408 U.S. at 701.
330. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). The needs of law enforcement also prevailed
over an asserted newspaper privilege in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547
(1978), in which the Court permitted a search warrant to be used by police to search
the newspaper's files for evidence of the identity of perpetrators of a crime. The
defendant's need for information in his defense also overrode a claimed newsman's
privilege in New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 99 S. Ct. 6, 11 (1978) (White, Marshall,
J.J.) in which Myron Farber of the New York Times was held in contempt for. refusal
to turn over his notes to the judge who requested them in order to determine whether
they were relevant to the defense in a criminal case. Justices White and Marshall,
acting as Circuit Justices, refused to stay the contempt order. Justice Marshall
indicated that he thought Farber's claim of privilege should be granted, but
Branzburg and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), see note 337 infra, had
made it clear that the Court would not agree.
331. 408 U.S. at 740 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
332. Id. at 743 (footnotes omitted).
333. See text accompanying notes 316 to 318 supra.
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information sought would be helpful before permitting the questions
that would determine what would ultimately be found. "It is only
after the grand jury has examined the evidence that a determination
of whether the proceeding will result in an indictment can be
made." 334
Only Justice Douglas would have eliminated all power to engage
in compulsory disclosure. In his view, "[s]ooner or later, any test
which provides less than blanket protection to beliefs and associa-
tions will be twisted and relaxed so as to provide virtually no
protection at all." 335
[T]he people, the ultimate governors, must have absolute
freedom of, and therefore privacy of, their individual opinions
and beliefs regardless of how suspect or strange they may
appear to others. Ancillary to that principle is the conclusion
that an individual must also have absolute privacy over
whatever information he may generate in the course of testing
his opinions and beliefs.33 6
The principles which Justice Douglas set forth in Branzburg are
closely related to the arguments made by ex-president Nixon to
justify refusing to release tapes of his discussions with subordinates,
as required by a subpoena issued pursuant to an indictment
charging those subordinates with various offenses against the
United States.337A president needs to obtain as much information
and advice as possible to make sound decisions, and revelation of his
private discussions may deter others from adequately informing or
advising him. He also needs to know whether officials within his
administration have been engaged in criminal actions, though a
president's involvement in plotting the commission of an unlawful
act would not be expression entitled to first amendment protec-
tion.338 In situations such as that presented in United States v.
334. 408 U.S. at 701-02.
335. Id. at 720 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
336. Id. at 714.
337. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). The indictment concerned the
well-known "Watergate" break-in - the unlawful trespass on the Democratic Party
National Headquarters at the Watergate complex in the District of Columbia - and
the attempt to frustrate the investigation and prosecution of the persons involved.
President Nixon was named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the "cover-up."
338. President Nixon's claim was based on a concept of executive privilege derived
from the nature and function of the office of the president. He did not base the claim
on the first amendment. In setting forth the reasons for nondisclosure of presidential
discussions, he, of course, never suggested enabling the president to commit crimes
without detection as a justification for the privilege. Instead, he argued that inquiry




Nixon,339 however, the protected discussion will inevitably be so
intertwined with references to the president's illegal conduct that it
cannot be isolated. An argument might therefore be made that the
tapes of such presidential discussions should be protected in their
entirety. 340
From this perspective, the claim of executive privilege may be
viewed as essentially a first amendment claim similar to that of
Branzburg, but with the interests at stake writ large. 341 Although the
need for privacy to promote the free exchange of ideas exists in all
personal communications, it is especially acute with respect to
presidential conversations: to reach decisions that will be most
beneficial to society, the president and his subordinates must be free
to explore a wide range of alternatives. Such discussions often
involve input that many officials would be unwilling to express
freely except in private. At the same time, the very magnitude of a
president's decision increases the importance of the discussions as a
basis for the electorate to judge his performance and hold him
accountable. 342 If corruption exists at the highest level of govern-
ment, it affects many more people adversely than a single criminal
act. Thus, the government's asserted interest in disclosure of such
discussions also appears substantial.
In Nixon, the Supreme Court analyzed the President's claim of
executive privilege by applying a balancing test: "In this case we
must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality
of presidential communications in performance of the President's
responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair
administration of criminal justice." 343 Recognizing that no special
need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security
secrets had been asserted, the Court unanimously rejected the
339. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
340. As a practical matter, President Nixon could not have raised his fifth
amendment rights when the tapes were requested. Politically it would have been
suicide. In addition, his fifth amendment rights would apply to his testimony but not
to his recordings, although the first amendment applied to both.
341. The purpose of the textual discussion of Nixon is to demonstrate that the issue
of the scope of executive privilege is similar to the issues generated by a first
amendment claim and that the Court's response was consistent with its approach in
free speech cases.
342. In construing the Freedom of Information Act, Justice Douglas, in particular,
emphasized the first amendment considerations associated with keeping the public
informed of governmental operations. He may have believed that government
officials surrender some of the first amendment rights they would have as private
citizens to keep discussions confidential. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105-11 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
343. 418 U.S. at 711-12 (footnote omitted).
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President's assertion of a privilege calculated to protect free
discussion, concluding:
when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed
materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the
generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of
privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for
evidence in a pending criminal trial. 344
The argument about the legitimacy of such an executive
privilege implicates issues of history and concepts of separation of
powers far beyond the scope of this Article; but with respect to the
first amendment aspects of the claim, the Court's opinion followed
its prior rulings. As a majority of the current Court now hold,
disclosure may be required if requested for a legitimate purpose other
than suppression of speech. Because the purpose of the disclosure at
issue in Nixon - requests for tapes in criminal trials - was the
discovery of criminal conduct or exculpatory evidence, the Court
found no constitutional impediment; the demands of the fair
administration of criminal justice prevailed.
Two other disclosure cases involved bank records. The Bank
Secrecy Act of 1970345 authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to
prescribe certain bank record-keeping and recording requirements
that have "a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory
investigations or proceedings. ' ' 3 46 Financial institutions are required
to keep records of their customers' identities and to make microfilm
copies of their checks and certain other transactions. Reports to the
federal government of large transactions of currency either inside or
outside of the country are required, as are reports of United States
citizens or residents, and nonresidents doing business in the United
States, with respect to their transactions and relationships with
foreign financial institutions. A variety of plaintiffs, including
banks, bank customers, and the American Civil Liberties Union,
sought to enjoin the enforcement of the Act in California Bankers
Association v. Shultz. 347Although much of the case was devoted to
consideration of questions of search and seizure under the fourth
amendment and self-incrimination under the fifth amendment, the
344. Id. at 713.
345. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959 (1976); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1062,
1081-1083, 1101-1105, 1121-1122 (1976).
346. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b(a)(2), 1951(b) (1976); 31 U.S.C. § 1051 (1976).
347. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
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ACLU also raised the first amendment argument that the require-
ments could be used to discover the names of its members and
contributors, thereby deterring membership in the association.
Although recognizing that an organization might have standing to
assert the rights of its members to be free from compelled disclosure
of their membership, and that absent a countervailing governmental
interest such disclosure could not be compelled, a majority of the
Court replied that the attack on bank record-keeping requirements
was premature because the petitioners had not shown any attempt
by the government to obtain the records. 348 The challenge to the
foreign reporting requirements was also dismissed on the ground
that there was no concrete controversy because the ACLU had not
alleged that it regularly engaged in foreign currency transactions. 349
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall each filed a separate
dissent. Justice Douglas condemned the record-keeping provisions
for overbreadth, citing primarily first amendment cases 35° and
arguing that because such provisions were aimed at discovering
criminal activity their prospective use to obtain indirectly an
account of one's ideology, interests or opinions was impermissible.
Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Douglas but also would have
held the Act void for vesting excessively broad authority in the
Secretary of Treasury.351 Justice Marshall focused more directly on
the first amendment claims:
348. Id. at 56 n.26. The Court here cited Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), as
authority for the proposition that the first amendment claims were not concrete
enough to present a "case and controversy." Laird involved not a requirement of
record-keeping or disclosure to the government, but a military practice of keeping files
on individuals. The procedural point on justiciability masked a decision based on the
first amendment. The existence of the files chilled activity that might be recorded for
fear of adverse use of the files. If the keeping of the files violated the first amendment,
therefore, there should be standing to challenge the practice before the files were
actually used. The Court, however, concluded that it was impossible to determine
whether the files had a legitimate purpose until they were used. In effect, this
conclusion amounts to a finding that such files are constitutional though some uses of
them may not be.
349. 416 U.S. at 75-76. It should be noted that Justices Powell and Blackmun
concurred specially because under the regulations the domestic reporting require-
ments were only on transactions of over $10,000. They believed that a significant
extension of the reporting requirement would pose "substantial and difficult
constitutional questions .... " Id. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring).
350. See id. at 86 n.7 (Douglas, J., dissenting). "Where fundamental personal rights
are involved as is true when as here the Government gets large access to one's beliefs,
ideas, politics, religion, cultural concerns and the like - the Act should be 'narrowly
drawn' . . . to meet the precise evil." Id. at 85-86. Justice Douglas did not clearly
distinguish between speech rights derived from the first amendment and privacy
concerns of other derivation, however.
351. Id. at 91-92 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also discussion of narrow
construction of delegation of authority in Ancillary Doctrines, supra note 9, at 701-03.
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The threat of disclosure entailed in the existence of an easily
accessible list of contributors may deter the exercise of First
Amendment rights as potently as disclosure itself. . . . More
importantly, however slight may be the inhibition of First
Amendment rights caused by the bank's maintenance of the list
of contributors, the crucial factor is that the Government has
shown no need, compelling or otherwise, for the maintenance of
such records. 352
It seemed apparent from the scope of the record-keeping
requirement that it was not directed towards discovering the identity
of members of associations, but was intended to provide a data bank
for discovery of particular illegal acts. Until the information is
sought for use, however, one cannot be certain whether the purpose
was legitimate. Thus, despite the existence of some chilling effect on
speech, the majority considered the case premature. All the justices
agreed that the case turned on the need for information as weighed
against the effect on expression. The majority wanted to make sure
that government would be able to take all legitimate steps and,
therefore, upheld the law pending a showing that the government
had an illegitimate purpose. The dissenters simply gave less weight
to the legislative concern - to the asserted governmental interest -
in their anxiety to be certain that the law was not directed at
innocent speech and association.
Subsequently, the Court in Eastland v. United States Service-
men's Fund35 3 was confronted with an attempt by the government to
use bank data. The Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security,
pursuant to its inquiry into the effect of subversive activities in the
United States, issued a subpoena duces tecum to a bank for all
records involving the account of U.S.S.F.354 The U.S.S.F. had
established coffeehouses near military installations and assisted the
publication of papers for distribution in military installations, all in
opposition to the war in Vietnam. In an action to enjoin the
implementation of the subpoena and for a declaratory judgment that
As Justice Brennan had argued in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 269-82 (1967)
(Brennan, J., concurring), delegation of power that potentially affects fundamental
rights in broad and indefinite terms should be void.
352. 416 U.S. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
353. 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
354. The Senate had authorized a study of "the administration, operation, and
enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950 .... " and the "extent, nature, and
effect of subversive activities in the United States," specifically "infiltration by
persons who are or may be under the domination of the foreign government . .
controlling the world Communist movement.... S. Res. 341, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
116 CONG. REC. 1974 (Jan. 30, 1970).
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the subpoena and the Senate resolutions authorizing it were void,
the Fund and two of its members argued that the sole purpose of the
subpoena was to harass and chill the organization and its members
in the exercise of their first amendment rights, and to dry up the
financial support of the organization. The plaintiffs further alleged
that the subpoena had been issued to the bank rather than to the
U.S.S.F. in order to deprive the organization of its right to protect
private records such as sources of contribution.3 55
The Court, however, ruled that the members of the subcommittee
and their chief counsel could not be enjoined because their acts were
protected under the speech and debate clause356 of the Constitution.
"[O]nce it is determined that Members are acting within the
'legitimate legislative sphere' the Speech or Debate Clause is an
absolute bar to interference"; 35v the " 'courts should not go beyond
the narrow confines of determining that a committee's inquiry may
fairly be deemed within its province.' ",358
Three concurring justices indicated that while the speech or
debate clause protected the committee against an injunction, it still
might be possible to enjoin the bank from producing the records at
issue because that clause insured "only that a Member of Congress
or his aide may not be called upon to defend a subpoena against
constitutional objection, and not that the objection will not be heard
at all."359 The subpoenaed bank was not in the jurisdiction in which
suit was brought and thus had not been made a party to it. The
355. 421 U.S. at 495. The Court explained that previous cases made clear "that in
determining the legitimacy of a congressional act [the Court] do[es] not look at the
motives alleged to have promoted it." Id. at 508. Disclaimer of a decision based on
motivation should not blind the observer to the influence apparent motivation has
had on the use of other doctrines of the Court.
356. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1: "For any Speech or Debate in either House, they
[Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place."
357. 421 U.S. at 503. The speech and debate clause has recently been used to
protect publications of congressmen. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). The crucial questions revolved around whether the
act of a congressman or his or her assistant was done as part of the legislative
function. In Eastland, the Court easily found that inquiries by congressional
committees were part of the legislative function.
358. 421 U.S. at 506 (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 368 (1951)).
359. 421 U.S. at 516 (Marshall, Brennan & Stewart, JJ., concurring).
I write today only to emphasize that the Speech or Debate Clause does not
entirely immunize a congressional subpoena from challenge by a party not in
a position to assert his constitutional rights by refusing to comply with it.. ..
This case does not present the questions of what would be the proper
procedure, and who might be the proper parties defendant, in an effort to get
before a court a constitutional challenge to a subpoena duces tecum issued to
a third party.
Id. at 513-17 (footnote omitted).
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Senators and their counsel were therefore the only parties to the suit,
but the emphasis in the majority opinion on the legitimacy of the
investigation suggests that they would have upheld the subpoena
even if the bank were a party because the information was relevant
to a proper legislative inquiry. 360
Justice Douglas dissented tersely on the ground that "no official
. . . may invoke immunity for his actions for which wrongdoers
normally suffer."' 361 Nevertheless, by filing suit solely against the
congressional committee, the plaintiffs placed themselves in the
worst possible position - forcing a confrontation between the speech
or debate clause and the first amendment. The concurring justices
avoided the clash by suggesting that there were other means for
protecting the plaintiffs' speech interest, while the majority seemed
to give little consideration to those claims.
The Court upheld similar disclosure requirements in Buckley v.
Valeo.362 As part of a statutory scheme to regulate campaign
spending, Congress had required presidential campaign committees
to keep a record of persons contributing more than ten dollars and to
file a report containing the names and addresses of each person who
contributed over one hundred dollars in a calendar year with the
Federal Election Commission. In addition, individuals contributing
more than one hundred dollars to advocate election of a particular
candidate were required to file a statement with the Commission.
The Court recognized that such compelled disclosure might substan-
tially infringe upon the exercise of free speech and accordingly
subjected the reporting and disclosure requirements 363 to "exacting
scrutiny. ' 364 These requirements were upheld, however, because the
360. Even the most cursory look at the facts presented by the pleadings reveals the
legitimacy of the USSF subpoena. Inquiry into the sources of funds used to
carry on activities suspected by a subcommittee of Congress to have a
potential for undermining the morale of he Armed Forces is within the
legitimate legislative sphere.
Id. at 506.
361. Id. at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
362. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
363. The Court also struck down the statute's expenditure ceiling on first
amendment grounds. See text accompanying notes 102 to 107 supra.
364. 424 U.S. at 64. The basis for the "exacting scrutiny" test was the language of
the Court's opinion in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958), in which the
Supreme Court dissolved a civil contempt fine of $100,000 against the NAACP for
refusal to disclose its membership lists to state authorities. In that case it was very
likely that the desire to obtain membership lists was part of a plan to destroy the
association, and the government was unable to proffer a convincing need for
disclosure of the organization's members. Thus, the Court found the disclosure order
failed to withstand "exacting scrutiny." The context in Buckley, however, made it




government's interest in regulating federal election campaigns was
deemed "substantial," 36 5 and because the "disclosure requirement
. . .appear[ed] to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils
of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found to
exist." 366
The Buckley Court noted that the balance might shift in favor of
nondisclosure for some minority parties and independent candidates
because the governmental interest in deterring corruption and the
purchase of elections by large contributors was significantly less
substantial with respect to candidates of small minority parties.
367
Conversely, the damage to the associational rights of the members
of such parties would be significantly increased because of the
parties' greater vulnerability to reductions in contributions and
reprisal. The Court, however, found that no appellant in the case
before it had made a factual showing of harm sufficient to tip the
balance in its favor.368 As to the appellants' claim that a blanket
exemption from disclosure requirements should be granted minority
parties lest irreparable injury to their associational rights be
inflicted before the requisite evidence could be gathered, the Court
stated that "[w]here it exists the type of chill and harassment
[required to justify relief] can be shown,"369 and concluded that no
blanket exemption was necessary.
The cases discussed thus far in this section have favored the
government's attempts to get information when it can demonstrate
the information might be used for purposes other than suppression
of ideas. Despite the Court's rejection of inquiry into motivation, the
Gibson doctrine 370 remains available if the Court suspects the
legislature is trying to suppress speech rather than engaging in
proper legislative inquiry. That is, the Court may demand that the
legislature demonstrate the existence of a significant danger before
365. 424 U.S. at 66-68. The Court listed three interests to be satisfied by a
disclosure requirement. First, it is a source of information that helps voters in
deciding for whom to vote. Second, it deters corruption and the appearance of
corruption by making large contributions and expenditures public. Finally, it is a
means of detecting violations of the other requirements of the campaign financing
laws. Id.
366. Id. at 68.
367. Id. at 70-71. The splinter party candidate is virtually certain to lose, so the
danger that contributions to his campaign are for the purpose of controlling his
actions after election is virtually nonexistent.
368. Id. at 71-72.
369. Id. at 74. Chief Justice Burger dissented from this portion of the opinion on
the ground that the governmental interest in such low thresholds as $10 and $100 for
reporting requirements was so insubstantial that it did not outweigh the contributors
interest in expression. Id. at 239 (Burger, C.J., dissenting in part).
370. See notes 316 to 318 and accompanying text supra.
[VOL. 38472
BALANCING FREEDOM OF SPEECH
interrogating witnesses, and confine its questions to those closely
relevant to the showing of danger that has been made.
This year the Court was again confronted with the first
amendment issues involved in compelling disclosure, although, as in
Branzburg,371 the compulsion stemmed from the functioning of the
judicial system itself, rather than from a statute. In Herbert v.
Lando,372 the plaintiff Herbert sued Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., producer and editor Barry Lando, reporter Mike Wallace, and
The Atlantic Monthly magazine for a report on the television show
"Sixty Minutes" and an article in The Atlantic Monthly, both of
which allegedly defamed him. In pretrial discovery proceedings,
Herbert asked a number of questions to which Lando objected. The
questions could be grouped into five categories:
"1. Lando's conclusions during his research and investigations
regarding people or leads to be pursued, or not to be pursued,
in connection with the "60 Minutes" segment and the
Atlantic Monthly article;
"2. Lando's conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees
and his state of mind with respect to the veracity of persons
interviewed;
"3. The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that he did
reach a conclusion concerning the veracity of persons,
information or events;
"4. Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matter to
be included or excluded from the broadcast publication; and
"5. Lando's intentions as manifested by his decision to include
or exclude certain material. '373
The defendants claimed that these questions infringed upon their
rights under the first amendment, but the Supreme Court disagreed,
ruling that the plaintiff in a defamation suit may inquire about the
state of mind of the defendants and, more specifically, about
editorial discussions that precede allegedly defamatory publications.
Questions about thoughts and beliefs evoke an Orwellian spectre
of the Big Brother who insists on knowing the ideas and beliefs of
every citizen in order to control them. 374 The questions asked of
Lando, however, were intended to cast light on his past actions, not
371. See text accompanying notes 324 to 336 supra.
372. 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979).
373. Id. at 1652 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (quoting 2d Cir. opinion, 568 F.2d
974, 983 (1977)).
374. G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
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to alter thought patterns or prevent future misconduct, and the Court
apparently perceived no threat of invasion of personal thoughts and
beliefs when the inquiry is predicated upon past activities. Even
Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed that inquiry into the editor's
"thought processes" - his "thoughts, opinions and conclusions" -
would not discourage the editorial thought process, reasoning that
"[s]ince a journalist cannot work without such internal thought
processes, the only way this aspect of the editorial process can be
chilled is by a journalist ceasing to work altogether." 37 5 The only
inhibiting effect that the Court attributed to an inquiry into the
editor's state of mind was that associated with publication of
material the editor believed to be false. But, in the words of the
Court, "if the claimed inhibition flows from the fear of damages
liability for publishing knowing or reckless falsehoods, those effects
are precisely what New York Times and other cases have held to be
consistent with the First Amendment." 376
The defendants argued that permitting questions about editorial
discussions could result in the suppression of opinions and
information. If statements by an editor expressing doubt over the
truth of allegations could be used as evidence that the decision to
publish was made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of
truth, editors might be reluctant to voice such doubts. The Court,
however, was not convinced that such speech would be significantly
affected by permitting pre-trial discovery:
Moreover, given exposure to liability when there is knowing or
reckless error, there is even more reason to resort to pre-
publication precautions, such as a frank interchange of fact and
opinion. Accordingly, we find it difficult to believe that error-
avoiding procedures will be terminated or stifled simply because
there is liability for culpable error and because the editorial
process will itself be examined in the tiny percentage of
instances in which error is claimed and litigation ensues. 377
In sum, a clear majority of the Court was convinced that the
inquiries into the editorial process were necessary to ascertain
whether the defendants had acted properly, and were not designed to
375. 99 S. Ct. at 1657 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Justice Marshall stated that
"[riegardless of whether strictures are placed on discovery, reporters and editors must
continue to think, and to form opinions and conclusions about the veracity of their
sources and the accuracy of their information." Id. at 1665 (Marshall, J., dissenting in
part).
376. Id. at 1646. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964),
the Court held that a public official must prove "actual malice" - making a
statement knowing it to be false, or having a "reckless disregard" for its truth - to
prevail on a suit for defamation relating to his official conduct.
377. 99 S. Ct. at 1648.
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suppress ideas or information. But the Court was careful to note its
concern that trial judges insist on the relevance of such questions
and restrict discovery when" 'justice requires [protection for] a party
or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense . . . . ' Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c)"; 378 and Justice
Powell concurred to emphasize the duty of the district court to
consider first amendment interests in ruling on discovery. "I join the
Court's opinion," he wrote, "on my understanding that in heeding
these admonitions, the district court must ensure that the values
protected by the First Amendment, though entitled to no constitu-
tional privilege in a case of this kind, are weighed carefully in
striking a proper balance. '' 379
Striking a proper balance was also the key to Justice Brennan's
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He objected that
Justice Powell did not make clear exactly what first amendment
values should be weighed by the district court380 and argued that,
because only discovery of editorial discussions threatened to inhibit
free speech, an editorial privilege with respect to such discussions
should be recognized and the speech interests served by the privilege
balanced against the interest in preventing and redressing attacks
upon reputation. To overcome this privilege, Justice .Brennan would
require a public-figure plaintiff to establish "to the prima facie
satisfaction of a trial judge, that the publication at issue constitutes
defamatory falsehood . ".3.. 381
The majority responded to Justice Brennan's analysis by noting
that the complaint must allege a defamatory falsehood and that an
affidavit or verified complaint would appear to satisfy any
requirement of a prima facie establishment of a defamantory
falsehood. 38 2 In addition, Justice Powell's concurrence pointed out
that the district court could delay enforcing a discovery demand in
the hope of a resolution of issues through summary judgment.38 3
Thus, if no real issue of defamatory falsehood was posed, defendants
would be able to resist discovery. In this light, the Court viewed
Justice Brennan's requirements as a mere "formalism" that should
not be embedded in the Constitution.
Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that inquiries into the
editorial process were irrelevant to the issue at trial. He argued that
the issue in public-figure defamation actions is whether the
378. Id. at 1649.
379. Id. at 1651 (Powell, J., concurring).
380. Id. at 1659 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
381. Id. at 1660.
382. Id. at 1648 n.23.
383. Id. at 1651 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
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defendant knew the defamatory statement was untrue or published
it in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity, and that the reason for
publishing the statement was simply not relevant to the suit.384
Therefore; he would have remanded the case with directions to the
trial court to measure each proposed question strictly against the
New York Times criteria. 385 The majority rejoined that the trial court
had used the proper criteria and the correctness of its decisions on
relevance was not before the Court,386 but perhaps more can be made
of Justice Stewart's relevancy point than appeared in his opinion.
Journalists, like other humans, will form opinions about the people
whose actions they observe. This can easily lead the journalist to
dislike a particular public figure, and while reporters would insist
that their personal feelings did not affect their reporting, a jury
might believe that dislike of the plaintiff led to a reckless disregard
for the truth. Fear of such a misguided jury determination might
lead reporters to be especially reluctant to write articles critical of
persons they believe to be reprehensible. The most relevant evidence
of knowing falsity or reckless disregard of truth is the information
that was available to the reporter prior to publication. The minor
value that evidence of the journalist's attitudes towards the plaintiff
might have in resolving the crucial issue would appear to be
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.387 Such considerations may well
underlie Justice Stewart's insistence that the publisher's motivation
is irrelevant to the case.
Finally, Justice Marshall, alone among the justices, would have
accorded editorial discussions an absolute privilege. Unlike the
majority, he was convinced that discovery of editorial deliberations
would deter journalists from expressing doubts as to the accuracy of
information. While he admitted that evidence of such statements
might be relevant to the issue of whether the journalist acted in
reckless disregard for the truth, he argued that other means to
establish deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth are sufficient.
"To the extent that such a limited privilege might deny recovery in
some marginal cases," he wrote, "it is, in my view, an acceptable
price to pay for preserving a climate conducive to considered
editorial judgment. '388
Although almost all the justices agreed that expression would
not be inhibited by inquiry into the journalists's "internal editorial
384. Id. at 1661 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
385. See note 305 supra.
386. 99 S. Ct. at 1650 n.27.
387. See Quint, Toward First Amendment Limitations on the Introduction of
Evidence: The Problem of United States v. Rosenberg, 86 YALE L.J. 1622 (1977).
388. 99 S. Ct. at 1667 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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processes," they divided on the need for inquiry into the prepublica-
tion editorial discussions. The majority found no serious impairment
of discussion even here, while Justices Brennan and Marshall
foresaw a significant effect on expression. Justice Brennan would
have required a stronger preliminary showing of need for such
discussions, while Justice Marshall concluded that alternative
evidentiary sources made any need for discovery of editorial
processes so marginal that it was insignificant in the face of the
impact it would have to deter expression.
Summary and Conclusion
An idea is an abstraction. Its expression requires a person to
express it and a means to communicate it. Although the government
has no legitimate purpose in suppressing ideas, it may have a
legitimate interest in regulating the particular speaker or the
particular means chosen for expression. The Supreme Court has
ruled that the state has a legitimate concern in protecting the public
from injuries inflicted by the means used to communicate38 9 or by
acts linked to the speech. 390 It has also held that the government
may protect its ability to govern by insisting that the speech be
consistent with the function of the speaker in society when the
speech either indicates that the speaker will not properly perform his
job391 or is itself inconsistent with proper performance. 392 The
government may also have a legitimate interest in increasing speech
and the dissemination of information, whether by attempting to
provide greater access for opposing views3 93 or by obtaining
information it needs to make wise decisions. 394
Government action justified by legitimate governmental inter-
ests may decrease the expression of ideas; indeed, the justification
may be a pretext for suppressing the idea. Decisions such as
Bates,395 Bellotti,396 Buckley397 and Linmark39 demonstrate that the
389. See Section I (Speech Plus) supra.
390. See Section ID (Commercial Speech) supra.
391. See Section III (Speech as Evidence of Unfitness) supra.
392. See Section IV (Speech of Special Groups Impairing Governmental Functions)
supra.
393. See Section II (Regulation for Speech Reasons) supra.
394. See Section V (Requiring Non-Incriminating Disclosure to Aid Government
Functions) supra.
395. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), discussed at pp. 421-22 supra.
396. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), discussed at pp. 409-10 supra.
397. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), discussed at pp. 407-09 supra.
398. iUnmark Assoc. Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), discussed
at pp. 420-21 supra.
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Court will carefully scrutinize the governmental action and will find
it unconstitutional if analysis reveals that the concern of the state
was to suppress the expression of ideas. When a legitimate
governmental interest is furthered, the Court has usually stated that
it will weigh that interest against the resulting impairment of
speech. The Court has reserved the power to invalidate legislation on
the ground that it impairs expression too greatly even though the
law is the only possible means of furthering a legitimate governmen-
tal interest. 399 It has, however, never exercised this power. Instead,
when the Court has struck down a law as a result of weighing
interests, it has resorted to ancillary doctrines such as overbreadth
and vagueness. Through the use of these ancillary doctrines, the
Court has avoided weighing the general value of the governmental
goal against the value of speech, weighing instead the incremental
degree to which a governmental interest is furthered by the
particular form of challenged action against the impact on
expression that results from the use of that form. 400 Thus, for
example, the issue is not whether national security is more
important than freedom of expression. Rather, it is whether a
specific loyalty test which inhibits expression will further national
security enough to justify using it instead of an alternative that also
protects national security without as severe an impact on speech. In
this more specific balancing process, the views of the justices on the
degree to which expression is impaired and the degree to which the
legitimate interest is furthered have often differed. There is,
however, no real disagreement on the nature of the task they
perform.
The balancing decisions of the Supreme Court are consistent
with the theory that the first amendment's prohibition on abridging
the freedom of speech is simply a statement that suppression of
ideas is not a legitimate governmental purpose. In view of the
difficulty of detecting that purpose, the Court has created prophylac-
tic rules designed to assure that the forbidden purpose does not
underlie specific governmental acts. This theory explains balancing
as an attempt by the Court to evaluate interests asserted by the
government in terms of their potential as thoughtless or deliberate
pretexts to suppress speech. The weighing is not scientific. Indeed,
as the Court perceives society responding to its standards it may
399. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring), discussed at pp. 401-03 supra.
400. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), discussed at pp. 440-41
supra.
[VOL. 38
BALANCING FREEDOM OF SPEECH
determine either that they are not effective to forestall deliberate
suppression of ideas, or that they stifle needed governmental action,
and refine its standards in the light of experience.
This Article is the final installment of a comprehensive three-
part discussion of the theory of the first amendment as applied by
the Supreme Court.40 1 The theory itself, however, may be only one
example of a more comprehensive theory of the nature of the
Constitution. Other provisions in that document can be viewed as
authorizing or prohibiting not specific acts, but specific purposes.
From this perspective, the changes, cycles and developments in
constitutional doctrine may be seen as proper behavior for a Court
charged with implementing a purposive document with only limited
means for divining governmental purpose. The decisions of the
Court often may not be commanded by the Constitution, but in a
society steeped in the common law tradition, they may be within the
appropriate discretion of a Court charged with using the means
available to it to enforce the Constitution's commands. 40 2
401. The first two articles are Bogen, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the
Guarantee of Freedom of Speech, 35 MD. L. REV. 555 (1976); Bogen, First Amendment
Ancillary Doctrines, 37 MD. L. REV. 679 (1978).
402. See generally Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Foreward:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
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